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Sex Discrimination Laws Versus
Civil Liberties
David E. Bernsteint

Many Americans believe in two ultimately conflicting principles: first, that civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom
of association, and freedom of religion, must be protected from
infringement by the government; and, second, that a broad antidiscrimination principle requires government to intervene in civil
society in order to eliminate discrimination against a wide variety
of protected groups, including women.1 The tension between these
two ideals is increasingly apparent in cases involving the enforcement of sex discrimination laws.
Through the 1960s, most antidiscrimination activists considered civil liberties and civil rights to be complementary. When
southern state governments attempted to suppress civil rights
protests, activists found refuge in constitutional protections.2
Meanwhile, early civil rights enforcement actions generally were
targeted at large employers, places of public accommodation, and
other organizations that could not plausibly charge that their
civil liberties were being invaded to any significant degree.3
t
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Perhaps the most profound work arguing for the importance of government enforcement of a broad antidiscrimination principle is Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality (Yale 1996).
See, for example, NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449, 453 (1958);
NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 419 (1963). See also Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The
History of an American Controversy 78 (Nebraska 1994). Walker notes that the major civil
rights groups traditionally opposed hate speech restrictions, in part out of self-interest.
Activists on behalf of racial equality often engaged in provocative and at times offensive
tactics that required constitutional protection.
' A few libertarian advocates of property rights and absolute freedom of association
raised objections to antidiscrimination laws that impacted the private sector. See, for
example, Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness; A New Concept of Egoism 134 (New Ameri-
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In the ensuing decades, the American public has become
strongly ideologically committed to the idea that discrimination is
morally wrong and should be prohibited whenever possible. The
elite, including the judiciary, is even more committed to this ideology.4 The result is that antidiscrimination law - including sex
can Library 1964) ("Just as we have to protect a communist's freedom of speech, even
though his doctrines are evil, so we have to protect a racist's right to the use and disposal
of his own property."); Robert Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, New Republic 21, 22 (Aug
31, 1963) (objecting to a proposed interstate accommodations act on the grounds that it
would require "a substantial body of the citizenry" to "deal with and serve persons with
whom they do not wish to associate" in order to remain in their current trades; characterizing race discrimination as "ugliness," but also characterizing the justification for legislation enforcing antidiscrimination norms in business transactions as "a principle of unsurpassed ugliness"); Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 Cornell L Q 228
(1964) (arguing that state legislation requiring nondiscrimination in public accommodations and various personal service occupations violates the Thirteenth Amendment by
forcing one person to serve another); see also Phyllis Tate Holzer & Henry Mark Holzer,
Liberty or Equality?, 8 Modern Age 134 (1964).
The strict libertarian view received little notice in the statist 1960s; the public
debate instead focused on whether federal antidiscrimination laws violated states' rights
and/or required racial quotas. Moreover, given that much discrimination was intertwined
with state action, it is not at all clear that the strict libertarian view was correct even from
a libertarian perspective. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds (Harvard
1992); David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 Natl Black L J
276, 285 (1994); David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass":The Decline of Laissez-faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 Am U L Rev 85, 135 (1993);
David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A HistoricalExample of the Use of Government Regulatory PowerAgainst African-Americans, 30 San Diego L Rev 89 (1994) (all discussing the
role of state action in promoting discrimination).
' This antidiscrimination at all costs ideology has even gained a strong foothold in
the ACLU, once a redoubt of uncompromising civil libertarianism. See David E. Bernstein,
Liberties vs. Anti-Bias Laws, Wash Times B3 (Aug 15, 1999) (discussing the ACLU's progressive abandonment of civil liberties in favor of antidiscrimination policies). The following excerpt from an article by ACLU president Nadine Strossen reveals the tension
within the organization:
For us the tension between equality and liberty is in some circumstances
real and perplexing; even the ACLU's traditional -focus on impartial protection of free speech can be questioned from the perspective of those who
have been traditional targets of its indiscriminate exercise. We wonder
whether it is too easy for those individuals and groups who benefit from
competitive norms of social and political interaction and from the primacy
of procedural fairness in classical liberal theory, to deny or denigrate the
perceptions, needs, and rights of those who more often lose than win. But
some of us in the ACLU continue to insist that in the end, and in the
service of the ends we seek, liberty and equality reinforce each other. We
contend that the ACLU should remain one of the last strong refuges for
the process-oriented, content-impartial norms of traditional liberalism a philosophy and politics that empowered, and provided a moral foundation for both the civil rights movement of the 1960's and the feminist revival of the 1970's. Out of such fundamental arguments, which perhaps
can never be fully resolved, the ACLU nonetheless renews its own
strength, and determines when and how to speak and act on questions of
public policy that involve civil rights and civil liberties.
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discrimination law, the subject of this Article - has expanded to
the extent that the laws have begun to impinge seriously on civil
liberties, including the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and free exercise of religion.
Part I of this Article discusses conflicts between sex discrimination laws and civil liberties. In the workplace and on campus,
sexual harassment law has become a threat to freedom of speech
in the context of "hostile environment" claims. Meanwhile, unlike
the federal 1964 Civil Rights Act, which does not ban discrimination on the basis of sex in public accommodations,5 many more
recent state and local antidiscrimination laws do contain such a
ban. The phrase "public accommodations" is often defined broadly
to encompass seemingly private organizations, to the extent that
public accommodations laws have invaded the right of freedom of
association. Religious employers, who have only limited official
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, were once largely unaffected by discrimination lawsuits, no doubt in part due to reluctance by potential plaintiffs and enforcement agencies to challenge religious practices. The growing potency of antidiscrimination ideology, however, combined with the promulgation of state
laws that provide narrower religious exemptions than Title VII,6
led by the 1980s to a series of lawsuits alleging sex discrimination by religious employers for actions taken in accordance with
their religious beliefs.
Part II of this Article shows that courts generally have been
unsympathetic to constitutional defenses to antidiscrimination
lawsuits. The Supreme Court has led the way by consistently
ruling that the government has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination that trumps civil liberties. Because no discrimination is tolerable, the compelling interest test is apparently
applied without regard to the specific facts of the case at bar. The
author concludes that the Court's application of the compelling
interest test permits courts to render decisions based on vague
ideological commitments that have no basis in the Constitution.
Some argue that a better method of protecting antidiscrimination
law from constitutional scrutiny would be for the Court to abandon the compelling interest test and instead treat discrimination
Mary Ellen Gale and Nadine Strossen, The Real ACLU, 2 Yale J L & Feminism 161, 172
(1989) (footnotes omitted).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201-07, 201(a), (bXl), (c)(1), Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat
241, 243-47 (1964), codified at 42 USC §§ 2000a-2000a-6, 2000a(a), (b)(1), (cXl) (1994).
6 Ohio, for example, provides no exemption for religious employers. Ohio Rev Code
Ann § 4112.01(B) (Page 1980).
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like a tort such as trespass. This Article rejects such a solution as
inconsistent with the American constitutional tradition, and as a
grave danger to civil liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Finally, Part III of this Article discusses normative, nonconstitutional reasons that civil liberties should be protected from
encroachment by antidiscrimination laws. Among other things,
concern for civil liberties reflects appropriate skepticism of concentrating power in the hands of the government; offers protection of individual and group autonomy, including the autonomy of
those protected by antidiscrimination laws; shields unpopular
minority groups from discriminatory enforcement of antidiscrimination laws; limits church-state conflict; and protects
against overly zealous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in
contexts where such enforcement creates a clear net social loss.
This Article concludes by arguing that if the United States is
to preserve and protect its liberal heritage, to the extent sex discrimination laws and other antidiscrimination laws clash with
constitutional protections of civil liberties, civil liberties must triumph.
I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SEX DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES

This Section discusses conflicts that have arisen between sex
discrimination laws and freedom of speech, freedom of association, and free exercise of religion. Sex discrimination law most
often clashes with free speech concerns in the context of "hostile
environment" law. Public accommodations laws threaten the associative rights of members of private clubs. Religious employers
have found their free exercise rights jeopardized by lawsuits and
administrative actions brought under antidiscrimination laws.
A. Freedom of Speech
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 7 employers
(generally those with at least 15 employees) may not discriminate
against an individual with respect to hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, privileges or conditions of employment because of
such individual's sex.8 Because harassment of employees affects
the terms or conditions of employment, harassment based on sex
8

42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1994).
Id at § 20O0e-2(a)(1).
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can constitute employment discrimination. Hostile educational
environments, meanwhile, are unlawful under Title IX of the
1972 Education Amendments to the 1964 Act.9 Because speech
and other forms of expression that would normally be protected
outside the workplace can be used as evidence of a hostile environment, hostile environment law has clashed with freedom of
speech.
1. Hostile Work Environment.
The Supreme Court has held that a Title VII hostile work
environment violation occurs when "the workplace is permeated
with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,'.. . that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment... ""'o Whether an environment is sufficiently
hostile or abusive to be punishable under Title VII is determined
by "looking at all the circumstances," including the "frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.""
Several courts have held that hostile environment liability
can be predicated on speech that would be protected from government regulation if it occurred outside the workplace. 2 In
Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 3 for example, a female
shipyard worker won a hostile environment claim against the
yard." Because the claim was based in part on offensive speech,"
' The Department of Education's guidelines for Title IX require universities to ensure that women do not face hostile environments on campus, or the universities face the
loss of federal funds. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed Reg 12034, 12038 (1997).
10 Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21 (1993), quoting Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 65, 67 (1986).
Id at 23.
12 In addition to the cases discussed in the text below, the court in Berman v Washington Times allowed a hostile environment claim to be predicated on a work environment
.replete with misogynistic decorations, including degrading signs, pictures of scantily-clad
women, and a pornographic game." 1994 WL 750274, *3 (D DC) (citations omitted).
A Minnesota federal court found that a hostile workplace claim could be based in
part on pervasive "visual references to sex and to women as sexual objects" and verbal
statements and language reflecting a "sexualized, male-oriented, and anti-female atmosphere," including the frequent use of the terms "honey" and "babe" in conversation with
women. Jenson v Eveleth Taconite Co, 824 F Supp 847, 879-80 (D Minn 1993), revd on
other grounds, 130 F3d 1287 (8th Cir 1997).
760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).
Id at 1490-91.
1
The plaintiff alleged and the defendant acknowledged the widespread presence of
photos of nude and partially nude women in various areas of her workplace. Id at 1490.
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the court issued an extremely broad injunction, barring "sexual or
discriminatory displays or publications" anywhere in the workplace by the shipyard's employees.16
While Robinson involved severe harassment, including
physical harassment, at least one decision has been issued
against a defendant based purely on political satire in the course
of a union election campaign. Sixty-six year-old Sylvia Bowman
ran for president of her union.17 Defendant David Heller, a coworker, prepared and distributed to other workers two photocopies of caricatures depicting Bowman's head and name superimposed over nude and partially nude female bodies."i Bowman successfully sued Heller in Massachusetts Superior Court on a variety of grounds, including her right to be free from sexual harassment under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. 9
A Minnesota federal district court, meanwhile, has explicitly
stated that suppressing any kind of speech in the workplace that
is hostile to women is appropriate under Title VII. The court
stated that "expression in the workplace that is offensive to and
has a psychological impact on a member of a protected group may
be prohibited... including undirected expressions of gender intolerance."20 The court opined that political speech by employees,
She also alleged that co-workers made sexual and discriminatory remarks about her and
other women either to her or in her presence, and that there was graffiti directed at her,
written in her workspace, which facts the defendant also acknowledged. Id at 1492-1502.
" Id at 1542. The injunctive relief ordered by the court included the adoption by the
defendant of a sexual harassment policy banning the following types of speech at the company:
(1) displaying pictures, posters, calendars, graffiti, objects, promotional
materials, reading materials, or other materials that are sexually suggestive, sexually demeaning, or pornographic, or bringing into the [ ] work
environment or possessing any such material to read, display or view at
work.
A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it depicts a person of either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited
to or ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and
around the shipyard and who is posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to private portions of his or her body.
(2) reading or otherwise publicizing in the work environment materials
that are in any way sexually revealing, sexually suggestive, sexually demeaning or pornographic. ...
Id. This injunction apparently would bar an employee from bringing a copy of Ulysses, or
even a Danielle Steele novel, to work. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 ChiKent L Rev 701, 722 (1995) (criticizing the court's injunction as overbroad).
" Bowman v Heller, 1993 WL 761159, *1 (Mass Super Ct) (unpublished disposition).
Id.
Id.
Jenson, 824 F Supp at 884 n 89 (citations omitted).
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such as wearing a shirt at work that says "a woman's place is on
her back," is proscribed by Title VII.21
To the extent Title VII requires employers to limit workplace
speech to avoid civil liability, Title VII constitutes government
regulation of speech. A few anecdotal cases do not prove that Title VII is generally forcing employers to regulate workplace
speech. Nonetheless, many commentators persuasively argue
that because speech can be used as evidence of a hostile environment, employers justifiably believe that they must prohibit potentially offensive speech.22
Any instincts employers may have to give their employees
leeway are discouraged by official government pronouncements
suggesting that only a total clampdown will do. For example, an
official United States Department of Labor pamphlet states that
harassment includes cases where a co-worker "made sexual jokes
or said sexual things that you didn't like," so long as the jokes
made it "hard to work."2" A sensitive or religious individual may
find that any sex-oriented remarks make it hard for her to work.
No wonder an employment law expert advises employers that:

" Id. Perhaps the most outrageous example of the use of political speech against a
defendant in a sex discrimination case occurred when Professor Julia Brown sued Boston
University after she was denied tenure in the university's English Department. See J.
Edward Pawlick, Freedom Will Conquer Racism and Sexism 221-23 (Mustard Seeds
1998). In trial and in closing argument, her attorney discussed a speech by university
president John Silber. The speech, delivered a few years earlier to a policy group in
Washington, D.C., argued that children benefit when one parent remains home with a
couple's child while the other parent works. The speech was critical of the growing number
of working women who were not around to raise their children. Id at 222-23. The attorney
cross-examined Silber about this speech, and the judge then gratuitously piled on: "Some
of those career women are in the universities, including your own?" "That is right." "And I
suppose one way to get them back in the kitchen, is to get them out of the university; is
that so?" Id at 223. In closing, the attorney stated: "It is hard to say just how this attitude
about working mothers affects his tenure decisions, but it is clear that women and not
men carry the burden of being seen as wives and mothers and not just as scholars." Id at
221. The jury awarded Brown $200,000 and tenure. Id at 223. The ruling admitting evidence regarding Silber's speech was criticized by the Court of Appeals, but the court nevertheless let the verdict stand. See Brown v Board of Trustees of Boston University, 891
F2d 337, 350-51 (1st Cir 1989) (finding that evidence of Silber's speech was inadmissible,
but that the admission of the speech was not prejudicial error).
See generally Jonathan Rauch, Offices and Gentlemen, New Republic 22 (June 23,
1997); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 Geo L Rev 627, 637 (1997). See also Jeffrey Rosen, In Defense of GenderBlindness, New Republic 25 (June 29, 1998); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St L J 481, 539
(1991).
United States Dept of Labor, Sexual Harassment:Know Your Rights (1994), discussed in Volokh, 85 Geo L Rev at 633 (cited in note 22).
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Suggestive joking of any kind simply must not be tolerated.... At the very least, you must insist that supervi-

sors never engage in sexual joking or innuendo; that also
goes for employees who hope to be promoted into supervisory positions.... Nip These Activities in the Bud....

Don't let your employees post pin-up photographs on the
walls, or tell sexual jokes or make innuendos.2 4
Employment consultants retained by companies commonly
tell employees "if what you're thinking even vaguely involves sex,
keep it to yourself."" Consultant Monica Ballard tells her executive clients that if an employee complains that a co-worker gets
the Victoria's Secret catalog at work, "you get rid of it."26
Frank Carillo, president of Executive Communications
Group, suggests that wise executives will ban workplace discussions of the "seamy details" of current political events relating to
sex, such as the Clinton-Lewinsky saga. Carillo states that "The
thing people have to remember in a corporate environment is that
because [the media says] it doesn't mean you can say it. The media has a certain license to say things that the average person
can't."27 Ms. Ballard likewise notes, "People think that if they
hear something on TV or the radio, they can say it at work. But
that, of course, is not the case. "
Regardless of what government agencies and employment
consultants say, courts are unlikely to find that a few sexoriented jokes, a single crude commentary about Clinton and
Lewinsky, or the public perusal of a Victoria's Secret catalog
meets the legal standard of sexual harassment. The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that "'simple teasing,' ...
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and
conditions of employment."' 9
The Court stated that "[p]roperly applied, [these standards
for judging illegal harassment] will filter out complaints attackPhillip M. Perry, Avoid Costly Lawsuits for Sexual Harassment,18 No 3 Law Prac
Mgmt 18 (Apr 1992).
' John Cloud, Sex And The Law: Sexual harassment can mean firing victims who
don't give in or merely telling a dirty joke. Clinton'sfate rests on laws that tic even lawyers
into knots, Time 48, 52 (Mar 23, 1998).
2
Id at 52.
' Kathleen M. Moore, Workers' Talk Dwells on Case, But Discreetly Sensitive Issue at
Water Cooler, The Record, Northern New Jersey A6 (Feb 2, 1998).
Yochi Dreazen, Talking Dirty: In our brazen era of Monica and Viagra, what subjects should be off limits at work?, Fla Times Union (Jacksonville) F1 (Aug 16, 1998).
Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2283-84 (1998) (citation omitted).
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ing 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.'" ° As the Court noted,"1 federal courts of appeals
have dismissed cases where the plaintiffs did not meet the appropriate threshold.32
Despite such favorable Supreme Court dicta and circuit court
precedent, a prudent employer nevertheless will go well beyond
what appears to be the letter of the law when formulating and
enforcing speech guidelines. First, precedent does not provide
clear guidance to an employer that wants to successfully defend
hostile environment cases without clamping down on workplace
speech.33 For example, while an occasional gender-related joke
will not create liability, some courts have held that a hostile environment can be created by a pattern of comments or jokes from
different employees. 4 One federal district court, for example,
found hostile environment liability based largely on jokes and
caricatures.35 As Justice Kennedy, joined by three other justices,
recently noted in a related context, the imprecision of sexual harassment law is such that those subject to its strictures necessarily operate in "a climate of fear."36
Second, and relatedly, the "severe and pervasive" liability
standard is sufficiently vague, good counsel sufficiently expensive, and juries sufficiently unpredictable that employers feel
compelled to settle meritless (but not legally frivolous) claims.
The applicable legal standard is so subjective that juries have
awarded tens of thousands of dollars to plaintiffs in cases where
appellate courts later held that, even accepting all of the plain31

Id (citation omitted).
Id.

See, for example, Gross v Burggraf Construction Co, 53 F3d 1531 (10th Cir 1995)
(affirming district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant because supervisor's
crude comments were not related to plaintiffs gender); Black v Zaring Homes, Inc, 104
F3d 822 (6th Cir 1997) (finding that supervisor's comments were insufficiently severe to
create an objectively hostile work environment); Baskerville v Culligan InternationalCo,
50 F3d 428 (7th Cir 1995) (same).
Rauch, New Republic at 22 (cited in note 22); Volokh, 85 Geo L Rev at 637 (cited in
note 22).
Rosen, New Republic at 25 (cited in note 22).
Cardin v Via Tropical Fruits, Inc, 1993 US Dist LEXIS 16302, *24-25 & n 4 (S D
Fla).
Davis v Montrose County Board of Education, 119 S Ct 1661, 1682, 1690 (1999)
(Kennedy dissenting) (dissenting from holding that federal law allows plaintiffs to sue
schools that get federal aid for sexual harassment by peers, and questioning constitutionality of hostile environment law); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Score Another One for the Behavior Police, NY Times A13 (May 31, 1999) ("To avoid liability, school officials will have an
incentive to monitor and punish far more sexual expression than the law actually forbids.").
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tiffs' allegations as true, the conduct in question was not sufficiently egregious to withstand defendants' motions for summary
judgment.37 In one such case, the jury even awarded punitive
damages to the plaintiff.38 Far better from the employers' perspective to crack down on speech than risk a punitive damages
award!
Third, regardless of the clarity of the legal standard, disgruntled employees or former employees can impose costs on employers even if they have a case that no attorney will take, simply by
complaining of harassment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC is legally required to investigate every complaint of sex discrimination. Thus, even a
trivial complaint based on "the sporadic use of abusive language,
gender-related jokes, [or] occasional teasing"39 can lead to a broad
investigation of the claim, costing the employer thousands of
dollars in responding to the claim.4 °
No wonder, then, that the Murfreesboro, Tennessee city government removed an impressionistic painting by Maxine
Henderson, depicting a partially clad woman, after a city employee filed a hostile environment complaint.41 After the city removed the painting, the City Attorney said, "I feel more comfortable siding with protecting the rights under the Title VII sexual
harassment statutes than I do under the First Amendment."42
The attorney also commented, "You really can't be too cautious. A
sexual harassment judgment usually has six zeros behind it."43

37
See, for example, Baskerille, 50 F3d at 430 (reversing jury award of $25,000);
Black, 104 F3d at 823 (reversing jury award of $250,000).
Black, 104 F3d at 823 (reversing jury award of $200,000 in punitive damages).
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2284.
For an example of the costs to a defendant of an investigation based on a meritless
complaint, see Michael Krauss, When You Face the PC Inquisition,Wash Times A27 (Jan
27, 1995).
4
See Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work
Environment Harassment, 17 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 305. The offended employee
said:

I personally find "art" in any form whether it be a painting, a Greek
statue or a picture out of Playboy which displays genitals, buttocks,
and/or nipples of the human body, to be pornographic and, in this instance, very offensive and degrading to me as a woman.
Even if I wanted to personally take time to appreciate this kind of "art,"
I reserve the right for that to be my choice and to not have it thrust in my
face on my way into a meeting with my superiors, most of whom are men.
Id at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42

Id.

, Rauch, New Republic at 22 (cited in note 22).
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2. Hostile EducationalEnvironment Law.
The major free speech issue that has arisen with regard to
hostile educational environment law is whether university codes
banning offensive speech are appropriate. Some university administrators enact and enforce speech codes in order to ensure
compliance with Title DC." Other administrators use the vagueness of current sexual harassment standards as an excuse to restrict speech that is unpopular with campus feminists.45
In a recent book decrying the recent increase in attempts to
suppress "offensive" speech on college campuses, the authors of
Shadow University4" observe that "Universities' protestations
that 'the government makes me do it' have become more common
since an infamous incident at Santa Rosa Community College."4 7
Male students there posted "anatomically explicit and sexually
derogatory" remarks about two female students on a discussion
group run on the college's computer network.4 8 When the female
students learned of the messages, they filed a complaint with the
United States Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights.
The Office found that the messages probably created "a hostile
educational environment on the basis of sex" for one of the students.49 The Office added that if a college tolerated such speech, it
would be in violation of Title IX. 5° To avoid prosecution under
Title IX, the college adopted a speech code for internet discussion
groups.5 1
The scope of sexual harassment guidelines at many public
universities - which are clearly subject to the First Amendment
is breathtaking. A few examples follow, and more can be found
in Alan Kors and Harvey Silverglate's Shadow University.

" See 62 Fed Reg at 12038 (cited in note 9).
See generally Daphne Patai, Heterophobia(Rowman & Littlefield 1998). As Nadine
Strossen notes, certain feminists "have used the concept of sexual harassment as a Trojan
horse for smuggling their views on sexual expression into our law and culture. By influencing the legal and societal understandings of this concept, procensorship feminists have
been alarmingly successful in effectively outlawing all sexual expression in many sectors
of our society, even without any claim that the particular expression is subordinating or
degrading." Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography:Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for
Women's Rights 119 (Scribner 1995).
Alan Kors and Harvey Silverglate, Shadow University (Free Press 1998).
41 Id at 90.
, For an account of the incident, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective:PrivateSpeech Restrictions,Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U Chi Legal F 377, 419 & n 148.
"
Idat419.
Id at 419-20.
Kors and Silverglate, Shadow University at 90 (cited in note 46).
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According to the University of Maryland's sexual harassment
policy, unacceptable verbal behaviors include "idle chatter of a
sexual nature," "sexual innuendoes," "comments about a person's
clothing, body, and/or sexual activities, comments of a sexual nature about weight, body shape, size, or figure," and "comments or
questions about the sensuality of a person."52 These verbal behaviors do "not necessarily have to be specifically directed at an
individual to constitute sexual harassment."53 Moreover,
"[g]ender-biased communications about women or men [and]
course materials that ignore or depreciate [sic] a group based on
their gender" constitute sexual discrimination.54
West Virginia University, meanwhile, has a sexual harassment code that demands the use of gender-neutral language,
even in situations where non-neutral language is routinely used
in society at large. The words boyfriend and girlfriend, for example, should be replaced with "friend," "lover" or "partner."55
Montana State University has a code that creates the broad
offense of "sexual intimidation." This includes "any unreasonable
behavior that is verbal or non-verbal, which subjects members of
either sex to humiliation, embarrassment, or discomfort because
of their gender." "Using sexist cartoons to illustrate concepts" and
"making stereotypical remarks about the abilities of men or
women" constitute sexual intimidation."
B. Freedom of Association
Conflicts between freedom of association and sex discrimination laws have arisen primarily in the context of state statutes
that ban discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of
sex. 7 These laws typically apply only to organizations providing
the public with goods or services," or, more generally, to "business establishments." 9
Kors and Silverglate, Shadow University at 154 (cited in note 46).
Id at 154-55.
Id at 155.
Id at 159.
Kors and Silverglate, Shadow University at 178-79 (cited in note 46).
Title II of the Federal 1964 Civil Rights Act bans discrimination in public accommodations that provide "goods or services." However, Title II does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. See note 5 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Or Rev Stat § 30.675 (1993); SD Cod Laws § 20-13-1(12) (1994).
See Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal Civ Code § 51 (West 1982). The pertinent language provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are

entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."
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At first glance, these laws hardly seem like drastic infringements on freedom of association. There is, after all, a long tradition in the Anglo-American common law that public accommodations should be open to all. But while some courts have held that
all-male private clubs are exempt from state public accommodations statutes,60 others have required seemingly private organizations - including Little League baseball,6 1 the Jaycees, 2 student
eating clubs, 3 a chapter of the Boys' Club," and a country club 5
to admit female members. 6 Moreover, some states and localities have amended their statutes explicitly to cover organizations
previously deemed private.67
C. Freedom of Religion
When the 1964 Civil Rights Act was under consideration,
many members of Congress were sensitive to the Title VII's potential conflict with religious freedom. The version passed by the
House of Representatives completely exempted religious organi-

See, for example, Maine Human Rights Commission v Le Club Calumet, 609 A2d
285, 287 (Me 1992) (finding that membership in a fraternal club was not an advantage or
privilege of public accommodation).
61 National Organization of Women v Little League Baseball, 318 A2d 198 (NJ 1974).
United States Jaycees v McClure, 305 NW2d 764 (Minn 1981). The court found that
the Jaycees offered "goods" in the form of "[1]eadership skills" and "services" in the form of
"business contacts and employment promotions." Id at 772.
' The court found that the eating clubs had "an interdependent relationship" with
Princeton University "that depriv[ed] the Clubs of private status." Frank v Ivy Club, 576
A2d 241, 260 (NJ 1990). The court did not focus on the "assiduously maintained legal
separateness of the Club[s]" and relied instead on what it called the "gestalt" of the clubs'
relationship with the University. Id at 256-57.
, Isbister v Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc, 707 P2d 212, 214 (Cal 1985) (finding that
the Boys' Club is a "business establishment" for purposes of the relevant public accommodations statute).
' Warfield v Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P2d 776 (Cal 1995). The court
relied on the fact that although the Club was financed primarily by members' dues and
fees, it also "derive[d] a significant amount of revenue, as well as indirect financial benefit,
from the use of its facilities, and the purchase of goods and services on its premises, by
persons who are not members of the club." Id at 778.
" But see Benevolent and Protective Orderof Elks v Reynolds, 863 F Supp 529 (W D
Mich 1994) (construing narrowly Michigan's public accommodations law).
' For example, '[I]n 1965, New York City adopted a Human Rights Law that prohibit[ed] discrimination by any 'place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.'"
New York State ClubAssn v City of New York, 487 US 1, 4 (1988), citing NYC Admin Code
§ 8-107(2) (1986). In 1984, the City amended the law to explicitly prohibit discrimination
in private clubs with more than 400 members that provided regular meal service and
received payment from nonmembers for the furtherance of business. Id at 6, citing NYC
Admin Code § 8-102(9) (1986). New York State has also tightened its public accommodations law. See Pact Reached on Bias Law for Some Clubs, NY Times B5 (June 22, 1994).
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zations from Title VII. 6 The Senate, however, refused to adopt
this exemption.69
Ultimately, religious organizations were exempted from Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment only
when the discrimination was based on religion, and only when
those organizations were engaging in religious activities.7 ° A 1972
amendment to the Civil Rights Act broadened the exemption so
that it applies to religious organizations even when they engage
in non-religious activities.7 The scope of this exemption is not
clear. Does it allow discrimination only against believers in another religion, or does it also allow discrimination against members of the religious organization who fail to comply with church
teachings? Regardless, religious groups have only a limited exemption from Title VII, and sometimes are subject to even
stricter state antidiscrimination laws.72
Religious views on sex discrimination in the employment of
clergy have rarely been the subject of legal controversy, because
the First Amendment creates a constitutional "ministerial" exemption to antidiscrimination laws for decisions involving the
employment of clergy.73 The few relevant cases that have arisen
have involved disputes regarding whether the plaintiff's position
was "ministerial" or not.74
On the other hand, several church-affiliated groups have
been sued for sex discrimination in employment in other contexts.
In EEOC v Pacific Press PublishingAssociation,75 the EEOC successfully sued the defendant, a religious publisher controlled by
the Seventh Day Adventist church, after the publisher fired an
employee who had complained to the EEOC that the publisher's
HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 10 (1963), reprinted in 1964 USCCAN 2355,
2402.
110 Cong Rec 12812 (1964).
42 USC § 2000e-1(a) (1970).
" "This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities." 42 USC § 2000e-1(a) (1994). The Supreme Court upheld this provision against an Establishment Clause challenge in Corp of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v Amos, 483 US
327(1987).
7
See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 4112.01(B) (Page 1980) (providing no religious exemption).
71 See Part II C.
, See, for example, McClure v Salvation Army, 460 F2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir 1972)
(rejecting sex discrimination claim by officer in the Salvation Army after finding that she
was the equivalent of a "minister" in the Salvation Army "church").
" 676 F2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir 1982).
70
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wage policy discriminated against women. The church unsuccessfully defended its action on freedom of religion grounds. By complaining to the EEOC, the church argued, the employee violated
church doctrine requiring all disputes to be resolved within the
church.
In two other federal circuit cases, Christian organizations
unavailingly attempted to defend on religious grounds their policy of paying married men a higher, "head of household" wage.7" A
Minnesota court enjoined a Christian employer from continuing
its policy of prohibiting the employment of those whose lifestyles
conflicted with the owner's beliefs, such as single women working
without their fathers' consent.77 Two federal courts have denied
summary judgment to church schools that fired employees who
gave birth out of wedlock. 7' A Michigan court held a Christian
school liable for sex discrimination because of its religion-based
policy not to hire women with small children.79
The best-known case involving a conflict between religious
belief and sex discrimination laws is Dayton ChristianSchools v
0 Dayton Christian Schools
Ohio Civil Rights Commission."
("DCS") refused to renew teacher Linda Hoskinson's contract
when she became pregnant. After she consulted an attorney, DCS
fired her. Hoskinson then filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex
and retaliatory discharge. 1
Two of the religious beliefs of the churches that operate DCS
became an issue in the subsequent litigation. First, the churches
believed that a mother should remain at home with her preschool age children. Second, they believed that members of the
church should not take each other to court, 3 but that disputes

76

See Dole v Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F2d 1389, 1397-99 (4th Cir 1990)

(finding that differential wage based solely on sex violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and that application of FLSA to schools did not violate schools' First or Fifth
Amendment rights); EEOC v Fremont Christian School, 781 F2d 1362 (9th Cir 1986)
(finding that school's policy of granting health insurance benefits only to the "heads of
household" violated Equal Pay Act and Title VII).
7 State v Sports & Health Club, Inc, 370 NW2d 844 (Minn 1985).
7
Vigars v Valley ChristianCenter, 805 F Supp 802 (N D Cal 1992); Dolter v Wahlert
High School, 21 FEP Cases (BNA) 1413 (N D Iowa 1980).
7 McLeod v ProvidenceChristianSchool, 408 NW2d 146 (Mich 1987).
578 F Supp 1004 (S D Ohio 1984), revd, 766 F2d 932 (6th Cir 1985), vacated, 477
US 619 (1986).
SI
578 F Supp at 1014.
In support of this proposition, the defendants cited I Peter 3, I Timothy 2, and
Titus 2. Id at 1011.
0 Id.
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should instead be resolved within the church. 4 All new DCS employees signed contracts in which they agreed to abide by this
doctrine.85
The Commission launched an intrusive preliminary investigation,88 and, after finding probable cause, issued a Conciliation
Agreement and Consent Order which it urged the DCS to sign."
The agreement stipulated, among other things, that contrary to
DCS's belief in resolving disputes solely through the church hierarchy, DCS "shall make clear in its employment contracts that
employees may contact the Commission if they believe they are
being discriminated against at any time because of handicap,
race, sex, religion, age, color, national origin or ancestry."8 After
protracted litigation focusing on relevant constitutional issues, 9
the plaintiff eventually abandoned her claim.9"
II. REACTION OF COURTS TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The growing conflicts between sex discrimination laws and
civil liberties have led to an increasing number of cases in which
parties assert constitutional defenses to sex discrimination laws.
While the courts have generally ruled in favor of defendants who
faced direct government regulation of their speech, they have often rejected free speech defenses in hostile environment cases,
freedom of association defenses in public accommodations cases,
and free exercise defenses in cases involving religious employers.
What is remarkable about the decisions rejecting constitutional
defenses is that the courts have frequently acknowledged, or assumed arguendo, that the laws in question impinge on the constiIn support of this proposition, the defendants cited Matthew 18:15-17 and Gala-

tians 6:1. Id at 1010-11.
' Id at 1012-13.
" The Ohio Civil Rights Commission asked DCS for the following: employment data
on Hoskinson, from Jan 1, 1977 to Oct 29, 1979; employee handbooks and rules; written
DCS policies governing discipline, discharge, and pregnancy; oral or written performance
evaluations and standards; standards for employees working with preschool children;
contract renewals; grievance procedures; employee resort to the legal system; determinations of the "serious philosophical differences"; inquiries into employees' financial status;
babysitting plans; job descriptions and model contracts; employee pregnancy and any
change of status and reasons therefore; and suspension and discharge records. Id at 1014.

Id at 1014-15.
Id at 1015 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Ohio Civil Rights Commission v Dayton Christian Schools, Inc, 477 US 619
(1986).
' Telephone Interview with Lee Reno, Assistant Superintendent, Dayton Christian
Schools (Dec 15, 1998). The litigation cost the school hundreds of thousands of dollars in

legal fees. Id. [Editor's Note: The University of Chicago Legal Forum does not verify personal interviews.]
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tutional rights of the defendants. The courts contend, however,
that sex discrimination laws trump these rights because of the
government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.
A. Freedom of Speech
As discussed below, courts have thus far consistently held
that finding a defendant liable for permitting a hostile work environment for women is constitutionally permissible, even if the
liability is predicated on speech that would be constitutionally
protected outside the work environment. On the other hand,
courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs who were penalized by
state universities for engaging in speech the universities deemed
offensive to women.
1. Hostile Work Environment.
Most hostile environment employment cases have focused on
the line between permissible and illegal conduct. A few private
employers, however, have unsuccessfully asserted First Amendment defenses to hostile environment claims. Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc was the first published opinion squarely
to address a First Amendment defense to a hostile work environment claim." Lois Robinson, a welder, brought the action alleging a hostile environment created by the apparently widespread presence of photos of nude and partially nude women in
various areas of her workplace.2 She also complained about sexual and discriminatory remarks made about her or about women
either to her or in her presence and about graffiti directed at her,
written in her workspace. The workplace was overwhelmingly
male and Robinson and other women were made to feel unwelcome by many of their male co-workers. 4 The court addressed
the company's First Amendment defense in some detail. 5 The
court denied that workplace speech is protected from employment
discrimination law. 6 Even if workplace speech is protected, the
760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).
Id at 1490.
Id at 1492-1502.
Id.
For criticism of the court, see Browne, 52 Ohio St L J at 539 (cited in note 22);
Eugene Volokh, Harassment Law and Free Speech Doctrine, available online at
<httpJ/www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokhlharasssubstan.htm#T44>
(visited on Dec 18,
1998), notes 19, 23, 36, 37, 43, 73 and accompanying text; Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L Rev 1791, 1814-15 (1992).
Briefly, the court found that: (1) the company was not expressing itself through the
"sexually oriented pictures or the verbal harassment by its employees"; (2) the pictures
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court added, the government's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination exempts hostile environment law from this protection.9"
Robinson has been extremely influential. Several courts have
cited its First Amendment holding favorably,9" and no case has
yet held directly that the First Amendment prohibits workplace
speech from being the basis of Title VII liability if that speech
would be protected in other contexts.9 9
2. Hostile EducationalEnvironment.
Courts have generally been sympathetic to claimants who
have been disciplined by state universities for offensive speech
not directed at a particular individual. Several speech codes have
and verbal harassment were not protected speech but "discriminatory conduct in the form
of a hostile work environment"; (3) the regulation of verbal harassment was merely a time,
place, and manner regulation of speech; and (4) female workers at JSI were a captive
audience in relation to the speech that comprised the hostile work environment. Robinson,
760 F Supp at 1535-36.
Id at 1536.
For cases following Robinson, see Bowman v Heler, 1993 WL 761159, *8 (Mass
Super Ct) (unpublished disposition) (stating that the standard must be that of a reasonable woman), revd on other grounds, 651 NE2d 369 (Mass 1995); Jenson v Eveleth Taconite Company, 824 F Supp 847 (D Minn 1993); Berman v Washington Times Corp, 1994
WL 750274, *5 n 4 (D DC) ("Although the Defendant has claimed that the First Amendment shields such behavior from liability, this Court finds itself in accord with those
authorities that have found that the Constitution does not bar government regulations of
such gender-based harassment in the workplace."); Baty v Willamette Industries,Inc, 985
F Supp 987 (D Kan 1997) (citing Robinson for support of the proposition that the First
Amendment does not preclude a finding of liability for hostile work environment sexual
harassment).
However, four Supreme Court justices have suggested that hostile environment
law may violate the First Amendment. Davis v Montrose County Board of Education, 119
S Ct 1661, 1682, 1690 (1999) (Kennedy dissenting). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has noted
in dictum that hostile environment law may conflict with the First Amendment. In DeAngelis v El PasoMunicipal Police Officers Assn, the court cited Robinson critics Volokh and
Browne, and suggested that "[wihere pure expression is involved, Title VII steers into the
territory of the First Amendment." 51 F3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir 1995).
Courts have been sympathetic to First Amendment objections to prophylactic
measures ordered by state and local governments to avoid creating a hostile environment
in the public sector workplace. The artist whose painting was removed from the Murfreesboro City Hall, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text, successfully sued the city.
Henderson v City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 960 F Supp 1292 (M D Tenn 1997). A district
court held that the removal of the painting violated the artist's First Amendment rights.
Id at 1300. Courts have also held that restrictions against on-duty firefighters, Johnson v
County of Los Angeles Fire Dept, 865 F Supp 1430, 1438, 1442 (C D Cal 1994), and prisoners, Mauro v Arpaio, 147 F3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir 1998), reading Playboy were unconstitutional restrictions on speech, despite claims that allowing men to read "girlie" magazines
in public places creates a hostile environment for women. On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit recently upheld a Virginia law restricting access by professors at state universities
to sexually explicit material on the Internet. The court did not, however, cite the prevention of a hostile environment for women as an acceptable rationale for such restrictions.
Urofsky v Gilmore, 167 F3d 191 (4th Cir 1999).
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been declared unconstitutional,'00 and courts have ruled in favor
of several parties who were sued after being disciplined by their
universities for speech-related offenses.
In 1991, eighteen members of a fraternity at George Mason
University, dressed in women's clothes, performed an "ugly
woman" skit in the university cafeteria."' A dean found the fraternity guilty of creating a hostile environment for women and,
because one of the "women" was in blackface, blacks.0 2 He prohibited the fraternity from holding sporting events or social activities for two years, and required the fraternity to submit other
planned activities to the university for approval during the twoyear probationary period.'
The fraternity, represented by a local ACLU attorney, sued
the university in federal district court. The university argued
that the skit was not protected speech, but, even if it were, the
state's compelling interest in providing an appropriate education
environment should trump the First Amendment in this case. 04
The court rejected those arguments. In some of the strongest language yet written supporting civil liberties over antidiscrimination claims, Judge Claude Hilton wrote that "The First Amendment does not recognize exceptions for bigotry, racism, and religious intolerance, or ideas or matters some may deem trivial, vulgar or profane." 5 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.'
The First Amendment also protected J. Donald Silva, a tenured professor at the University of New Hampshire, after six students accused him of sexual harassment.0 7 The students complained of two sexual allusions Silva made for illustrative purposes during a technical writing class, and made other general
allegations.0 8
After the university punished Silva, he sued in federal district court, claiming that the school's actions violated his First
" See, for example, UWM Post, Inc v Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System, 774 F Supp 1163, 1181 (E D Wis 1991) (striking down the university's rule
against directing discriminatory epithets at individuals as unduly vague and overbroad);
Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852, 867 (E D Mich 1989) (striking down speech
limitation as overbroad).
"01 Iota Xi Chapterof Sigma Chi Fraternity v George Mason University, 773 F Supp
792, 793 (E D Va 1991). For an account of the controversy, see Kors and Silverglate,
Shadow University at 158 (cited in note 46).
"o 773 F Supp at 792.
103 Id.

o
10Id
6

107
108

Id at 794.
at 795.
993 F2d 386, 393 (4th Cir 1993).
Silva v University of New Hampshire, 888 F Supp 293, 300-02 (D NH 1994).
Id at 300-01.
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Amendment rights. After the court found that Silva was likely to
succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claims, °9 the University settled, agreeing to reinstate Silva and to grant him
$230,000 in attorney's fees and back pay." °
While public universities are subject to First Amendment
constraints, private schools are not. One important constitutional
issue that has not yet been litigated.. is whether Title IX is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires private universities to
establish speech codes. In Grove City College v Bell,"' the Supreme Court held that Title IX does not conflict with the First
Amendment because private colleges
are free to avoid Title IX's
3
funds.1
federal
refusing
by
dictates
Grove City will not, however, necessarily dictate the outcome
of future free speech cases. Grove City involved a rather narrow
infringement on the college's and its students' First Amendment
rights. The government required the college to fill out paperwork
demonstrating compliance with federal antidiscrimination law
before the school could participate in a federal student aid program."' In rejecting the college's First Amendment argument, the
Court held that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept."1 5 Perhaps the
Court would find that regulations that interfere more directly
with freedom of speech are not "reasonable."
The Court might also reconsider the view that the First
Amendment is not violated by Title IX regulations merely because a school can refuse federal funds. Only an extraordinary
institution could survive in the competitive educational market" Id at 317. The court also granted injunctive relief as to other claims. Id at 326.
...Michael S. Greve, Sexual Harassment: Telling the Other Victim's Story, 23 N Ky L
Rev 523, 524 (1996).
II Title IX's ramifications for academic freedom were discussed briefly in Cohen v
Brown University, 101 F3d 155 (1st Cir 1996). This case involved allegations of Title IX
violations in the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program. The court stated that
"[wle are a society that cherishes academic freedom and recognizes that universities deserve great leeway in their operations. Nevertheless, we have recognized that academic
freedom does not embrace the freedom to discriminate." Id at 185 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Because the funding of sports programs seems far from the core
free speech concerns of more typical academic freedom issues, Cohen is of dubious precedential value for future controversies over speech codes.
1
465 US 555 (1984).
"'
Id at 575-76. The Court narrowly construed Title IX by holding that the entire
school was not subject to Title IX requirements when only the financial office received
federal funds. The Court held that the language of Title IX limited its requirements only

to the programs that received federal funds.
"'

Id at 558-63.
Id at 575.
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place while refusing federal funds such as federal loans and
grants for its students.11 If ever there were an unconstitutional
condition, forcing a university to give up its First Amendment
rights (and the rights of its students) in exchange for the money it
needs to survive is one. 7
Moreover, from an economic point of view, the denial of a
subsidy to a particular institution when subsidies are distributed
to its competitors is the equivalent of a tax on that institution in
a world where no subsidies were distributed. The federal government presumably could not tax a university for its academic
policies, so it should not be able to deny institutions that refuse to
adhere to federal guidelines on speech and academic freedom issues a subsidy available to everyone else.1
Finally, the Grove City Court dismissed the First Amendment rights of students by arguing that "Students affected by the
Department's action may either take their [federal loan money]
elsewhere or attend Grove City without federal financial assistance." 9 To the extent this "exit" argument has any weight, it
collapses outside the Grove City factual context of Title IX's requirements being applied only to a college's financial aid office. A
student, as the Court points out, could avoid having his or her

116

Hillsdale College in Michigan is a rare example of such an institution, an exception

that proves the rule. Beyond a few such exceptions, Title IX policies will be adopted nationwide by every institution. In a related area, the Court itself has recently recognized
that a "pressing constitutional question" would arise "if government funding resulted in
the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace." National Endowment for the Arts v Finley, 118 S Ct 2168, 2179
(1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
.. See Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining With the State 249-51 (Princeton 1993) (providing an unconstitutional conditions analysis of conditioning federal tax exemptions for
universities on waiver of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion). The Supreme Court has elsewhere noted that a small subsidy by the government can turn into
total control. FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364 (1984). Since the
government considers federal student loans and grants to be federal subsidies, it should be
clear that federal subsidies even to non-research-oriented universities are quite large,
increasing the dangers of control.
...The Supreme Court has occasionally, but not consistently, adopted a version of this
argument. In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc v Ragland, 481 US 221 (1987), the Court
stated that "a discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights protected by the First
Amendment." See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue, 460 US 575 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a Minnesota tax on paper and ink
used in newspaper production as an impermissible discriminatory tax). Compare Epstein,
Bargaining With the State at 249-51 (cited in note 117) (arguing that the government
should not be allowed to deny a tax exemption to a group if the government could not fine
the group for the same reason).
"9 Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555, 575 (1984) (overruled by statute).
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data gathered by not applying for aid. 2 ' However, under the
"Civil Rights Restoration Act,"12 all educational programs at universities are covered by Title IX if the university receives any
federal funds. Meanwhile, almost all universities receive federal
funds, as "receipt" is defined by federal law. 22 To the extent Title
IX dictates university curricula and speech policies, few students
will able to avoid the results. Students who want an educational
environment at odds with that dictated by Title IX are essentially
out of luck.
B. Freedom of Association
In the 1960s, even the most liberal jurists agreed that members of private clubs had a constitutional right to choose their
members without government interference. Justice Arthur Goldberg, for example, wrote: "Prejudice and bigotry in any form are
regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to
close his home or club to any person ...solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race."123 Several years later, Justice

Douglas stated:
The associational rights which our system honors permit
all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be
formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all
agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell
a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The
individual can be as selective as he desires.2 4
As late as 1972, the ACLU promulgated a policy on "private organizations" stating that "private associations and organizations,
"' Id at 575. If the student has a First Amendment right in this context, however, I do
not believe that she should be forced to waive it in order to receive federal aid available to
those who do not choose to exercise their rights.
.. Pub L No 100-259, 102 Stat 28 (1988), codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 USC and 42 USC (explicitly expanding the scope of Title IX liability).
'"
See 20 USC § 1681 (1994).
'"
Bell v Maryland, 378 US 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg concurring).
124 Moose Lodge No 107 v Orvis, 407 US 163,
179-80 (1972) (Douglas dissenting).
Despite the stirring rhetoric, holes in the liberal defense of associational rights were already beginning to appear in the early 1970s. Douglas, joined by Marshall, argued that
Moose Lodge was constitutionally prohibited from discriminating because by granting a
liquor license "the State of Pennsylvania [put] the weight of its liquor license, concededly a
valued and important adjunct to a private club, behind racial discrimination." Id at 183.
Brennan, joined by Marshall, also argued that the Moose Lodge must be prohibited from
discriminating because it was a recipient of a state liquor license. Id at 186. According to
Brennan, the liquor license transformed the lodge into a state actor bound by constitutional prohibitions of discrimination. Id at 184-85.
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as such, lie beyond the legitimate concern of the state and are
constitutionally protected against governmental interference."125
By the time civil rights cases involving private associations
reached the courts in the 1980s, however, the legal establishment's commitment to freedom of association had waned, as evidenced by the result in Roberts v United States Jaycees.2 ' In Roberts, the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that the Minnesota
Human Rights Act prohibited the United States Jaycees from
punishing local chapters that had admitted women members.12 v
The Jaycees argued that the Act violated its members' constitutional right of freedom of association.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court in
1984, the ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Minnesota reflecting a change in liberal attitudes toward the legal legitimacy of discrimination by private clubs. The Court's reasoning
reflected a similar shift in opinion among the legal elite. In its
decision, the Court acknowledged that forcing the Jaycees to admit women infringed on the Jaycees' right to freedom of association. However, the Court found that this infringement was constitutionally permissible because it advanced the state's compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination and ensuring "equal access
to publicly available goods and services."128

Over the next few years, the Court upheld California and
New York laws banning discrimination in private clubs.129 In the
California case, the Court displayed what can only be considered
contempt for the associational rights of members of California
Rotary Clubs. Not content to uphold the coerced admission of
women into the clubs, the Court claimed that it was doing so for
the Rotarians' own good. 3 '
William A. Donohue, The Twilight of Liberty: The Legacy of the ACLU 131 (1993).
468 US 609 (1984).
United States Jaycees v McClure, 305 NW2d 764 (Minn 1981).
1
Roberts, 468 US at 624. Regarding the public accommodation nature of the Jaycees, the Court quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court's description of the services offered
by the Jaycees: "[leadership skills are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment
promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages'...." Id at 626 (alterations in original), quoting McClure, 305 NW2d at 772.
129 New York State Club Assn, Inc v City of New York, 487
US 1 (1988) (finding that
New York City's Human Rights Law is not overbroad); Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537 (1987) (finding that state law did not violate the First
Amendment by requiring local Rotary Clubs to admit women).
30 The Court claimed that its ruling would help Rotary International achieve its
stated goals of providing humanitarian service and encouraging high ethical standards.
The addition of women, the Court added, would also likely enhance the goal of ensuring
that Rotary Clubs represented a cross-section of their communities. Board of Directors of
Rotary Intl at 548-49.
.
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Nor have private clubs found relief under state constitutional
provisions protecting freedom of association, even when such provisions are interpreted more broadly than the analogous provisions of the federal constitution. For example, the California Supreme Court held that its decision forcing a Boys' Club to admit
girls did not violate the right of freedom of association.131 According to the court, the state statute at issue was permissible under
the federal Constitution because it intruded "no further, and for
no less compelling purpose, than was the case in Roberts."132 The
court then proceeded to deny the club's claims under the California Constitution, even though the state constitution "affords
greater privacy, expressive, and associational rights in some
cases than its federal counterpart." 3
C. Freedom of Religion
Courts have consistently held that the minister-church relationship is constitutionally exempt from civil rights laws."3 This
relationship, courts have held, goes to the core of free exercise,
and regulating it would involve excessive entanglement of religion under the establishment clause. Ministerial employment decisions are constitutionally exempt from scrutiny even if the religious organization does not claim a religious motive for its allegedly discriminatory action.3 5 Courts have defined "minister"
narrowly. 3 '

'"
133

Isbisterv Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 707 P2d 212 (Cal 1985).
Idat221.

Id.

" See, for example, Young v Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F3d
184, 187-88 (7th Cir 1994) (holding Free Exercise Clause bars Title VII action by probationary minister against her church); EEOC v Catholic University of America, 83 F3d 455,
462 (DC Cir 1996) (holding Free Exercise and Establishment clauses barred Catholic
nun's Title VII sex discrimination claim); Scharon v St Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hospitals,929 F2d 360, 363 (8th Cir 1991) ("Personnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil
courts."); Van Osdol v Vogt, 908 P2d 1122, 1127 (Colo 1996) (holding Title VII claims
barred under Free Exercise clause since claims required evaluation of ecclesiastical matters); Porth v Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 NW2d 195, 200 (Mich 1995)
(holding Religious Freedom Restoration Act and free exercise clause bar application of
Michigan's Civil Rights Act to hiring practices of parish school); Geraci v Eckankar, 526
NW2d 391, 401 (Minn Ct App 1995) (holding establishment clause barred judicial review
of employment decisions).
" See, for example, Young, 21 F3d at 187-88; Catholic University of America, 83 F3d
at 462; Scharon, 929 F2d at 363.
" See, for example, Weissman v CongregationShaareEmeth, 38 F3d 1038, 1045 (8th
Cir 1994) (permitting ADEA claim by administrator of synagogue); Geary v Visitation of
the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, 7 F3d 324, 331 (3d Cir 1993) (permitting ADEA
claim by lay teacher in Catholic school); DeMarco v Holy Cross High School, 4 F3d 166,
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The Supreme Court provided a far broader protection for religious activity in 1963. In Sherbert v Verner,'37 the Court held
that generally applicable laws that interfere with the free exercise of religion, even indirectly, must pass the compelling interest
test.'38 In Employment Division v Smith,'39 however, the Court
overruled Sherbert, holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not
usually implicated by general laws that happen to impinge on
religious practice.
Three years after Smith, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in order to restore and
strengthen the Sherbert test." In City of Boerne v Flores, 4 ' however, the Supreme Court held that RFRA could not constitutionally be applied to state legislation. " 2
The compelling interest test, however, is far from dead, particularly with regard to some of the issues raised in this Article.
RFRA still applies to federal legislation, "3 and several states
have passed their own versions of RFRA. 4 Several state supreme
courts continue to apply the compelling test under their state

172-73 (2d Cir 1993) (same). But see Catholic University of America, 83 F3d at 463-65
(finding that a Canon law professor at a Catholic university is a "minister').
374 US 398 (1963).
1
Id at 406-08.
13 494 US 872 (1990).
42 USC §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). Under RFRA, no government could "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.. ." unless "it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 USC § 2000bb-1
(1994). The "least restrictive means" test was not part of the pre-Smith standard. See City
of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 534 (1997) ("Laws valid under Smith would fall under
RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise."). Another federal law makes the specific holding of Smith moot. 42 USC § 1996a
(1994) (prohibiting any state or the federal government from discriminating against or
penalizing any Indian for the ceremonial use of peyote).
1
521 US 507 (1997).
42 521 US at 536.
1
See In re Young, 82 F3d 1407, 1416-17 (8th Cir 1996) (holding that RFRA still
applies to federal government); but see Robinson v District of Columbia, 1997 WL 607540,
*1 n 1 (D DC) (stating that the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v Flores).
The rationale of Boerne, which was that Congress lacked the power to override state
legislation, suggests that the Young opinion must be correct. Congress inherently has the
power to create exceptions to federal laws. See Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L Rev 1465, 1540 (1999). For a different view, see Marci
A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct is Unconstitutional,Period, 1 U Pa J
of Con L 1, 11-12 (1998).
', See, for example, Conn Gen Stat Ann § 52-571b (West Supp 1999); Fla Stat Ann
§ 761 (West Supp 1999); RI Gen Laws § 42-80.1.3 (1997).
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constitutions,14 and Alabama has explicitly incorporated the
Sherbert test into its constitution. 4" Moreover, even under Smith,
the compelling interest test still applies to so-called hybrid
claims, where a party asserts a free exercise in combination with
other constitutional protections. The Court specifically alluded to
a situation in which free exercise of religion was asserted in conjunction with the right of parents to guide the education of their
children, 47 a situation that arises in cases when religious schools
discipline female teachers for failing to obey church rules.4 s
There has been no definitive ruling on whether requiring religious employers to obey sex discrimination laws passes the
compelling government interest test. In EEOC v Mississippi College, 4 ' the Fifth Circuit stated in dictum that even if enforced
compliance with Title VII would violate a religious college's free
exercise rights, the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination would allow the enforcement of antidiscrimination law. 5 °
The Ninth Circuit followed Mississippi College's "compelling
interest" dictum two years later in EEOC v PacificPress Publish-

'" As of February 1999, among states interpreting their constitutions, approximately
fifteen apply a strong compelling interest test, six give less protection to religion, and the
rest have not clearly spoken to the issue. Steve France, Not Under My Roof You Don't, 85
ABA J 26, 28 (April 1999) (graphic). See, for example, Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission, 874 P2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
Ala Const Amend 622 § 2(5).
Smith, 494 US at 881, citing Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972).
In the Dayton ChristianSchools case, for example, parents joined the school in its
lawsuit asking the federal district court to enjoin Ohio's investigation. On the other hand,
in this case, the district court held that the state had a particularly compelling interest in
banning discrimination by a private religious school. 578 F Supp at 1036.
For a discussion of why the compelling interest test is appropriate, at least from a
policy perspective, see notes 222-23 and accompanying text. See generally Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially DiscriminatoryReligious Schools, 60 Tex L R 259 (1982)
(arguing that free exercise clause protects schools that are so pervasively religious that
attending such a school is the equivalent of joining a church).
'"
626 F2d 477 (5th Cir 1980).
"'
Id at 488. The court went out of its way to specifically endorse the application of
Title VII to religious schools:
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute in
comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII, their effect
upon society at large is great because of the role they play in educating
society's young. If the environment in which such institutions seek to
achieve their religious and educational goals reflects unlawful discrimination, those discriminatory attitudes will be perpetuated with an influential segment of society, the detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated.

Id at 489.
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ing Association.51 The court acknowledged that disciplining the
Pacific Press for firing an employee who violated church teachings by complaining to outside authorities about sex discrimination burdened the Press's free exercise of religion. The court
added, however, that the government's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination justified the burden.152
In Dayton Christian Schools,'5 3 the district court held that
forced compliance with Ohio's sex discrimination law would "not
appear to place more than a minimal burden on the Plaintiffs'
free exercise rights."'54 The court thought it particularly significant that nothing in the law forced the plaintiffs "themselves to
act contrary to [their] belief 5 5 that mothers should remain at
home with their young children. 6 While DCS's free exercise interest purportedly was minimal, the court held that Ohio had "a
5 7
compelling interest in eliminating all forms of discrimination,"
and in preventing DCS from having a potentially deleterious impact on the young by having youth educated in an atmosphere of
discrimination.'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court,
finding that Ohio's employment discrimination law impermissibly
burdened DCS's free exercise of religion.5 9 The appeals court first
held that the application of the statute to this case would conflict
with the right of DCS parents to educate their children in a manner they deem appropriate. 6 1 Moreover, if the law were enforced
against DCS, the parents and sponsoring congregations would
confront the choice of "either supporting a school staffed by faculty who flout basic tenets of their religion or abandoning their
support of Christian education altogether."'' DCS's teachers,
meanwhile, found their exercise of religion "burdened by the Ohio
676 F2d 1272 (9th Cir 1982).
Id at 1279-80.
Dayton Christian Schools v Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 578 F Supp 1004 (S D
Ohio 1984).
"
Id at 1037.
"=
Id at 1034.
Id at 1034. In fact, DCS was not arguing that the law burdened any individual's
"
ability to act on this belief. Rather, DCS argued that the law made it more difficult to
teach its religious doctrines to its students by forcing it to employ a teacher whose actions
conflicted with the school's interpretation of Christianity. Id at 1012, 1018-19.
..
7 578 F Supp at 1034.
'" Id at 1036. The court also noted its "concern for protecting the freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life." Id at 1034-35, quoting Cleveland Board of
Education v La Fleur,414 US 632, 640 (1974).
766 F2d 932, 961-62 (6th Cir 1985).
ISo Id at 947.
...Id at 952.
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Civil Rights Commission's intrusion into the' faculty-selection
process and the imposition of secular guidelines for faculty retention." 62
The appeals court also noted the heavy burden the statute
placed on DCS. The school had to respond to invasive subpoenas,
and the Commission attempted to "compel appellants to relinquish the mandates of their consciences. " "
The court acknowledged that, under Supreme Court precedent, Ohio's interest in enforcing its antidiscrimination law is
"substantial and compelling."" The court nevertheless ruled
against the state for three reasons. First, religious freedom is a
constitutional right; the Constitution does not, on the other hand,
require Ohio to ban discrimination by private actors such as
5 Second, even if the state could not force religious instituDCS."'
tions such as DCS to compromise their beliefs to comply with antidiscrimination laws, the state could still enforce its antidiscrimination laws against the vast majority of employers. 16" Finally, under the holding of Bob Jones University v United
States,"7 the state could deny DCS any public benefits it receives,
including tax exemption, bus transportation, and other state
services. 1" Withholding such benefits would be a less restrictive
means of enforcing the state's antidiscrimination objectives.
Ohio appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. Religiously-affiliated groups such as the American Jewish
Committee, the Catholic Conference of Ohio, and the Seventh-day
Adventists filed amicus briefs on behalf of DCS. The ACLU, however, sided with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Interestingly,
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State filed an
amicus brief in support of the schools' position. "We are firmly
"I

Id at 952.

766 F2d at 951. As discussed previously, among other things, the Commission
wanted DCS to sign an agreement prohibiting it from considering employees' religious
beliefs in hiring decisions in the future.
164 Id at 953.
163

Id at 954.
'

Id at 955.
Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 602-03"(1983).

"'

766 F2d at 955. The court explained:

46

In Bob Jones, the Court upheld denial of tax exempt status to an institution which denied admission to those engaged in interracial dating. In

weighing the school's free exercise claim, the Court observed that
"[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the

operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets."
Id at 952, quoting Bob Jones University, 461 US at 603-04 (alteration in original).
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opposed to discrimination," said their executive director Robert
Maddox, "[b]ut this principle must not override the right of
the pastors or teachers they
churches or church schools to hire
" 1 69
believe can best teach their faith.

The Supreme Court ultimately sidestepped the civil liberties
issue by reversing the court of appeals on comity grounds. 7 ' The
Court held that the Sixth Circuit should not have interfered in
the state proceedings, and that mere investigation of the school
by the State of Ohio, in the absence17 of a sanction, could not in
itself violate the free exercise clause. '

D. Sex Discrimination Laws, Civil Liberties, and
the Constitution
While courts have sometimes held that constitutional civil
liberties limit the scope of the antidiscrimination laws, in other
cases courts have found that antidiscrimination laws could be
enforced even when they interfere with constitutional rights as
defined by the courts because the laws serve compelling government interests. Thus, the courts in Pacific Press, 7 ' Mississippi
College

73

and Dayton ChristianSchools,' 74 all held (or stated in

dicta) that Title VII trumps free exercise rights because the government has a "compelling interest" in "eradicating discrimination" against women. Similarly, in Roberts7 and Isbister,16 the

courts held that the state public accommodations laws overcame
the defendants' otherwise valid freedom of association claims under the compelling interest standard. In Robinson 77 and Baty, 78
the courts denied that hostile environment law impinges at all on
the First Amendment, but that, even if it did, freedom of speech
would need to give way to the government's compelling interest
in stamping out gender discrimination. Justices Brennan and
Marshall consistently joined the freedom of association

UPI, Religious Schools Await Supreme Court Ruling, The Record, Northern New
Jersey 010 (Mar 23, 1986).
'"
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v Dayton Christian Schools, Inc, 477 US 619 (1986).
'"

Id at 626-28.

EEOC v PacificPressPublishingAssn, 676 F2d 1272 (9th Cir 1982).
EEOC v Mississippi College, 626 F2d 477 (5th Cir 1980).
Dayton ChristianSchools, Inc v Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 578 F Supp 1004 (S
D Ohio 1984), revd, 766 F2d 932 (6th Cir 1985), vacated, 477 US 619 (1986).
"I Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 614 (1984).
17
Isbister v Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc, 707 P2d 212, 214 (Cal 1985).
Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F Supp 1486 (M D Fla 1991).
1
Baty v Willamette Industries,Inc, 985 F Supp 987 (D Kan 1997).
'
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opinions,'79 providing some sobering evidence of how commitment

to the antidiscrimination principle has watered down liberal
commitment to civil liberties."'I

The compelling interest test was originally meant to be a
shield, not a sword. Members of the Warren Court used this test
when they wished to expand constitutional liberties at the expense of the state."8 ' More recently, application of the compelling

interest test "has tended to be completely ad hoc, and driven
largely by political or social predilections,"'8 2 and this has been as
true in antidiscrimination cases as elsewhere.
Mississippi College seems to be the first case to declare that
the government's compelling interest in antidiscrimination laws
overcomes constitutional protections.8 3 This is also one of the few
cases in which a court attempted to explain why it held that "the
government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in all forms."8 4 According to the court, "Congress manifested
that interest in the enactment of Title VII and the other sections
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "1"s Similarly, in Pacific Press the
court claimed that "[b]y enacting Title VII, Congress clearly targeted the elimination of all forms of discrimination as a 'highest
priority."8 8
There are two problems with such reasoning. First, Congress
quite clearly did not manifest an interest in eradicatingdiscrimination by passing Title VI.' 87 Title VII is a civil (as opposed to
criminal) statute; only applies to employers with more than 15
"' Both Justices, for example, wrote or joined the majorities in Roberts, 468 US at
609; Board of Directors of Rotary International v Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537
(1987); and New York State Club Assn, Inc v City of New York, 487 US 1 (1988).
" On the other hand, liberal justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court
deserves praise for his consistent defense of civil liberties when they conflict with antidiscrimination laws.
"' For example, Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963); Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479
(1960) (articulating narrow tailoring requirement); Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234,
265 (1957) (Frankfurter concurring). Indeed, in 1972 Gerald Gunther described strict
scrutiny analysis, by which he meant the compelling interest test, as "strict' in theory but
fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword:In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv L
Rev 1, 8 (1972).
" Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 Cal L Rev 297,
319(1997).
'
626 F2d at 489.
Id at 488.
5 Id.
l" 676 F2d at 1280.
187 In fairness to the Fifth Circuit, several years earlier the Supreme Court had

claimed that "eradicating discrimination" was a "central statutory purpose" of Title VII.
Albemarle PaperCo v Moody, 422 US 405, 421 (1975).
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employees;188 contains damage caps and limitations;189 requires
EEOC approval before filing suit; 9 ' and, of course, contains a religious exemption. 9 ' These features of the statute are consistent
with an interest in limiting discrimination, but just as certainly
conflict with a purported intent to eradicate discrimination.
Second, and more important, Congress does not have the
power to limit the scope of a constitutional right by manifesting
an interest in doing so. If this dictum were followed in other
cases, the Court would never overturn congressional statutes on
First Amendment grounds. Congress, for example, "manifest[ed]
an interest" in making flag-burning illegal'92 - as did the fortyeight states that had flag protection laws before Texas v
Johnson... held them unconstitutional." Yet the Court still held
that such laws violated the First Amendment. 95
As discussed below, the Supreme Court, like the Fifth Circuit, has argued that the government has a compelling interest in
eradicating at least certain types of discrimination, and that this
interest is sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.
However, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Court has not clearly articulated why it believes eradicating discrimination is a compelling interest.
In Bob Jones University v United States,9 ' a case involving a
ban on interracial dating at a religious university, the Court held
that free exercise rights could be overcome by the government's
"fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education."197 This interest manifested itself in decades
of court decisions and federal legislation banning discrimination
in public education.
From this relatively narrow baseline, just two years later in
the Roberts case the Court went well beyond even the Mississippi
College dictum, holding that a state's interest in eradicating discrimination can trump a constitutional right, even if Congress
has not endorsed the interest at issue. The Roberts Court, as we
42 USC § 2000e(b) (1994).
42 USC § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
42 USC § 2000e-5.
42 USC § 2000e-1(a).
'"
See United States v Eichman, 496 US 310 (1990) (overturning federal ban on flag
burning).
491 US 397 (1989).
Id at 421.
"
Id.
461 US 574 (1983).
Id at 604.
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have seen, held that Minnesota's public accommodations statute
overrode the Jaycees' associational rights. 9 ' The Court held that,
although Minnesota's Human Rights Act infringed on the Jaycees' right to freedom of association, it did so to advance compelling interests, i.e., eliminating gender discrimination and ensuring "equal access to publicly available goods and services."199 According to the Court, discrimination on the basis of gender is "invidious" and produces "special harms" because it is based on "archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and
capacities of the sexes" and therefore "forces individuals to labor
under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to
their actual abilities."2 0
As George Kateb points out, "A compelling state interest is
what allows the restriction of freedom."2" 1 Truly compelling interests, Kateb notes, such as "deterring incitement to imminent
lawless action" are one thing; "making 'leadership skills' and
'business contacts' and 'employment promotions' more available"
to women, as the Roberts Court claimed it was doing, is quite another.0 2 These goals are not self-evidently compelling enough to
allow a restriction of freedom, but the Court asserted that they
03
2

are.

Although the interest in forcing the Jaycees to admit women
was purportedly compelling, federal law did not (and still does
not) forbid public accommodations to discriminate on the basis of
sex. The Court justified its decision by repeating the Minnesota
Supreme Court's finding that Minnesota had a "strong historical
commitment to eliminating discrimination."2°4 Bizarrely, a federal
constitutional right was overridden by a state's claimed compelling interest, 25 an interest not even protected by federal statute.
Another oddity in Roberts, as well as in other cases applying
the compelling interest test, is that the Court considered the im468 US at 621.
Id at 624.
"'
Id at 625.
20
George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Amy Gutmann, ed, Freedom of Association 59 (Princeton 1998).
2'
Id.
See Thomas v Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F3d 692, 714 (9th Cir
1999) (noting that "the Roberts Court was less than clear with respect to the precise considerations that led it to conclude that the elimination of gender discrimination constituted a compelling government interest").
Roberts, 468 US at 624.
For implicit criticism of this view, see Thomas, 165 F3d at 716 ("Nor, would it
'

seem, can a single state's law evince - under any standard - a compelling government
interest for federal constitutional purposes.").
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portance of eliminating discrimination in the abstract,0 8 rather
than considering whether the state's interest in the particular
case at issue was compelling. The underlying facts of Roberts
hardly established a compelling case for interfering with a federal
constitutional right.
The United States Jaycees is a leadership and networking
organization for young business leaders.0 7 The Jaycees originally
only accepted men, but by the early 1970s admitted women as
associate members.0 8 Associate members could participate in
Jaycees activities, but could not vote, run for office, or receive
awards." 9
In 1974, the Minneapolis chapter of the Jaycees voted to admit women as full members, and the St. Paul chapter followed in
1975.210 In 1975, the national Jaycees voted against admitting
women,211 but, responding to pressure from chapters around the
nation, voted in favor of an experimental program allowing
women to become full members.2 12 In 1978, however, national
delegates voted by a 3-1 margin against continuing the experiment, and the national organization ordered all chapters to once
again exclude women from full membership.2 13
Some chapters, such as the Omaha Jaycees, responded to
this decision by forming two parallel, separate organizations under the same holding company.2 14 One organization admitted
women to full membership and conducted the day to day activities of the Jaycees. The other organization did not admit women
as full members, and served as the Jaycees' link to the national
organization.21 Other local chapters, including the two Minnesota
chapters, refused to comply with the national organization's edict.
In December 1978, the president of the national organization advised the two Minnesota chapters that a motion to revoke their

The court noted that sex discrimination "both deprives persons of their individual
dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life." Roberts, 468 US at 625.
Id at 612-13.

Id at 613.
Id.
0 Douglas Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82
Mich L Rev 1878, 1878-79 (1984).
.. Id at 1898.
212
Mary McGrath, Jaycee Officer Lauds Review of Men-Only Rule, Omaha World
Herald (Jan 10, 1984).
213
Id. In 1981, the Jaycees members voted 2-1 not to admit women. Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals 194 (Princeton 1998).
"' McGrath, Jaycee Officer Lauds Review, Omaha World Herald (cited in note 212).
215 Id.

166

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLEGAL FORUM [1999:

charters would soon be considered, 16 and the chapters chose to
litigate.
Let us pause to note how little was actually at stake in this
litigation. Young businesswomen were admitted to the Jaycees as
associate members, and were therefore not excluded from the
networking opportunities the Jaycees provided.217 Moreover, the
maverick Minnesota Jaycees organizations were not being forced
to deny full membership to women; they could simply have broken off from the national Jaycees and formed their own organization. Less drastically, they could have followed the Omaha chapters' lead and largely circumvented the national organization's
edict. Also, it appears that the Jaycees would have soon accepted
women as members regardless of legal sanction.21 In any event,
Minnesota women had avenues besides the Jaycees through
which they could improve their career prospects."'
Thus, it appears that the state's interest in preventing sex
discrimination by the Jaycees was not objectively compelling, but
merely offended the Justices' sensibilities. The Court asserted
that the interest in eradicating discrimination justified the government's action. The Justices could not, however, have meant
that any action in support of that goal passes constitutional muster; eradicating a human behavior as common as discrimination
would require totalitarian measures inconsistent with the maintenance of a free society.
It appears, then, that the Supreme Court lacks a coherent
theory as to when and why enforcing antidiscrimination norms
constitutes a compelling interest.2 ° This makes unprincipled decision-making almost inevitable. Not surprisingly, ever since
Roberts was decided, litigants and courts have cited it for the
proposition that antidiscrimination laws, no matter how trivial,22 '
should trump federal constitutional rights.
"' Linder, 82 Mich L Rev at 1879 (cited in note 210).
211 United States Jaycees v McClure, 709 F2d 1560, 1573 (8th Cir 1983), revd by Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984).
28 Despite the lack of a legal requirement that they do so, the national Jaycees voted
at their next annual meeting to admit women as full members in all chapters. See note
305 and accompanying text.
McClure, 709 F2d at 1573.
See Volokh, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1494 (cited in note 143) ("Both the strict scrutiny
test's literal terms and the case law that has emerged under it in religious freedom cases
are so vague that they don't meaningfully constrain a judge's range of options.").
" See, for example, Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P2d 274,

280 (Alaska 1994) (holding that prevention of discrimination against unmarried couples
by landlords was a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome a landlord's free exercise
rights).
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Applied seriously, the compelling interest test would grant
some discriminatory activity constitutional protection. When the
test is only given lip service, as in Roberts, it becomes incoherent,
an empty vessel for the justices' moral intuitions. To better
ground the antidiscrimination principle in constitutional law,
some have suggested an alternative basis for exempting antidiscrimination laws from constitutional scrutiny. Instead of considering the government's interest in antidiscrimination laws, courts
should find that freedom from discrimination is a right, analogous to the right not to be libeled, or the right to be free from
trespass.222 No court would hold that the rights to freedom of association, free exercise, and free speech trump the nonconstitutional right to be free from trespass,22 and the same, it is
argued, should hold true for the right to be free from discrimination.
The Supreme Court seemed to adopt this line of reasoning in
Runyon v McCrary,224 at least for cases in which defendants argued that the right to freedom of association protected their discriminatory acts. In Runyon, the Court rejected a freedom of association defense to an antidiscrimination claim against a private
school. Instead of holding that the right did not apply in this case,
or that a compelling interest overrode the right, the Court stated
that the "the Constitution... places no value on discrimination,"
and that "[i]nvidious private discrimination ...has never been

accorded affirmative constitutional protections."225 The Court
quickly abandoned this rationale, however and it does not appear
in any Supreme Court case after 1984.22

The Court's decision to abandon the Runyon dicta was sound.
There are (at least) two reasons why courts should not treat disSee, for example, Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133 (1982); Mari Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320
(1989).
See, for example, American Life League, Inc v Reno, 47 F3d 642 (4th Cir 1995)
(holding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act did not violate the Free
Speech clause). Several courts have denied free exercise defenses to copyright violations.
See, for example, Urantia v Maaherra,895 F Supp 1335 (D Ariz 1995); Bridge Publications, Inc v Vien, 827 F Supp 629 (SD Cal 1993).
"'
427 US 160, 176 (1976). The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted the discrimination-as-tort rationale more directly. Swanner, 874 P2d at 284 (rejecting free exercise defense to fair housing law and explaining that "[b]ecause Swanner's religiously impelled
actions trespass on the private right of unmarried couples to not be unfairly discriminated
against in housing, he cannot be granted an exemption from the housing antidiscrimination laws").
Runyon, 427 US at 176, quoting Norwood v Harrison,413 US 455, 469-70 (1973).
This language was last cited in Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 US 69, 78 (1984).
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crimination like a tort for purposes of constitutional law. First,
such treatment would conflict with the ideological foundations of
the American constitution, and, second, such treatment would
pose a grave threat to civil liberties.
1. The Foundationsof The American ConstitutionalSystem.
The American constitutional system, as reflected in the Declaration of Independence, the body of the Constitution, the Bill of
Rights (especially the Ninth Amendment), and the Civil War
amendments, rests on the idea that the purpose of government is
to secure the natural rights of the citizenry - life, liberty, and
property. Common law rights, such as the rights to make and enforce contracts, to hold and alienate property, and to seek redress
for injury to person and property in the tort system, are consistent with the Framers' vision and were either undisturbed or
strengthened by various constitutional provisions.
By contrast, welfare rights, including the right to be free
from private discrimination, were not part of the original constitutional design and are not to be found anywhere in the Constitution or its amendments."' While since the Progressive era American legislatures have moved far away from the belief system that
motivated the Framers, the underlying constitutional structure
has not changed.22 The legislature can grant a "positive" right to
be free from private discrimination, but such a right cannot
trump the liberties granted by the Constitution absent constitutional amendment.229
2.

The Tort Paradigm Poses a Grave Threat to
Civil Liberties.
As they backed away from Runyon, the Justices may not
have been consciously aware that they were defending the moral
and philosophical basis of the American constitutional system.
As Richard Posner has observed, "The Constitution is a charter of negative liber-

ties." Bowers v DeVito, 686 F2d 616, 618 (7th Cir 1982).

Despite Bruce Ackerman and Larry Lessig's intriguing arguments to the contrary,

unless the Constitution is amended, its meaning does not change, particularly on fundamental matters. See Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations (Belknap 1998);
Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan L Rev

395(1995)
2 Akhil Amar argues that the Civil War Amendments grant a positive right to be
free from private discrimination. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of The Missing Amendments:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124 (1992). Amar's argument is persuasively
rebutted in Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far,106 Harv L Rev 1639
(1993). Even if Amar is correct, because his argument relies heavily on the Thirteenth

Amendment, it would be persuasive mainly in the context of laws protecting AfricanAmericans from discrimination.
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But surely they were aware that treating discrimination like a
tort posed a serious practical threat to the liberties protected by
the First Amendment.
Unlike trespass and other torts and crimes not entitled to
constitutional protection, antidiscrimination law has no clear
definitional boundaries. Federal antidiscrimination laws have
expanded over the decades from the original focus on race, with
lesser focuses on religion and sex, to include bans on discrimination on the basis of age,23 ' disability,

status,2 3

1

pregnancy, 2

marital

status.234

and veteran
In state and local jurisdictions,
antidiscrimination laws cover everything from sexual preference
to political ideology to weight to appearance, to, incredibly, membership in a motorcycle gang." If the Court were to argue that
the Constitution places no value on discrimination on any of
these bases, little would be left of the right of association, and
freedom of speech and religion would be significantly weakened
as well.
The concept of antidiscrimination is almost infinitely malleable. Almost any economic behavior, and much other behavior,
can be defined as discrimination. Is a school admitting students
based on SAT scores? That is discrimination against individuals
(or groups) who don't take tests well!3 s Is a store charging more
29 USC §§ 621 et seq (1994).
42 USC §§ 12101 et seq (1994).
42 USC § 3002 (1994).
See, for example, 5 USC § 2302 (1994).
38 USC § 4311 (1999).
'
The District of Columbia Human Rights Act, for example, prohibits discrimination
on the basis of an individual's "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital
status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, physical handicap,
matriculation, or political affiliation." DC Code Ann § 1-2512(a) (1992 & Supp 1993).
Michigan specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of weight. Mich Comp Laws
§ 37.2102 (1977). The University of Nebraska bans discrimination on the basis of hair
length. Josh Knaub, U. Nebraska Law Faculty Puts Hair-Length Dilemma to Rest, U-Wire
(Apr 21, 1999) (wire report). Minnesota bans discrimination in public accommodations
against members of motorcycle gangs. Minn Stat § 604.12, subd 2(a) (1998) ("A place of
public accommodation may not restrict access, admission, or usage to a person solely because the person operates a motorcycle or is wearing clothing that displays the name of an
organization or association.").
' This Article was written before the media discovered the draft of a new "resource
guide" to be published by the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights. This guide
establishes a rebuttable presumption that "the use of any educational test which has a
significant disparate impact on members of any particular race, national origin, or sex is
discriminatory" and hence illegal. John Leo, The Feds Strike Back, US News & World
Report 16 (May 31, 1999). This was also written before the author discovered that Pennsylvania apparently bars discrimination against those with a GED instead of a high school
diploma. See Eugene Volokh, "HostilePublic Accommodations Environment" Harassment
Law,
available
online
at
<http.//www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass/
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for an item than some people can afford? That is discrimination
against the poor! Is an employer hiring only the best qualified
candidates? That is discrimination against everyone else!
The obvious retort is that courts should limit their exemptions to laws prohibiting "real" discrimination, and not allow the
definition of discrimination to expand beyond what is reasonable.
But there is no consensus as to what constitutes "real" discrimination, nor does there appear to be any principled definition that
legislatures have followed.
One can, for example, define discrimination as treating the
alike unequally, but, even outside the controversial area of affirmative action, antidiscrimination law does not always follow
this definition. The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), for
example, defines discrimination not only as the unwillingness to
treat the disabled and non-disabled alike, but also as the unwillingness to subsidize the disabled. The ADA requires employers
and places of public accommodations to make "reasonable accommodations" for, in other words, provide a subsidy for, the disabledY7 For example, in the Bush Administration's first enforcement action under the ADA, the government ordered a CPA review company to pay for a full-time sign translator, even though
the interpreter cost far more than the student's tuition."'
Similarly, Title VII's ban on discrimination on the basis of
religion actually mandates preferential treatment for religious
employees. The statute requires that employers accommodate the
religious beliefs and observances of their employees, unless doing
so would cause the employer "undue hardship." 9 Thus some
hardship to the employer, which in economic terms constitutes a
subsidy to the religious employee, is mandated where necessary.
If failure to give members of a group a subsidy constitutes
discrimination, then just about any law can be defined as an anpubaccom.htmn#1> (visited Oct 1, 1999), citing an undated Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission publication.
27
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12112(b)(5XA) (1994); 34 CFR
§ 104.12(b)(2). An employer can only avoid liability for not making (and paying for) a "reasonable accommodation" if this accommodation would cause the employer "undue hardship," a condition defined rather stringently in 42 USC § 12111(10XB) (1994).
= Walter Olson, The Excuse Factory:How Employment Law is Paralyzingthe American Workplace 113 (Martin Kessler 1997).

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(7), Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103,
codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e(j) (1994) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.").

133] DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

171

tidiscrimination statute, and potentially be exempted from constitutional limitations. In short, exempting antidiscrimination
laws from the civil liberties protections manifested in the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment would destroy those protections.
III. WHY LIBERTARIAN CONCERNS SHOULD TRUMP SEX
DISCRIMINATION LAWS

This Section argues that sex discrimination laws should not
be permitted to impinge on freedom of speech, association, or religion. This recommendation should be followed both by legislatures when they consider expanding (or repealing) sex discrimination laws, and by courts when faced with constitutional defenses to sex discrimination laws.
Note that this discussion will assume that society can tolerate reasonable constitutional limitations on antidiscrimination
objectives. Not everyone agrees. Some believe that antidiscrimination law should almost always triumph because the offense
taken by a person subject to discrimination is a serious moral
harm that should not be protected from remedy by constitutional
norms.24 ° The appropriate response is that the price of living in a
free society is toleration of those who intentionally or unintentionally offend you. Not only is certain thickness of skin necessary for a successful free society, but a society that has a legal
system that expects such thick skin is likely to get it.
On the other hand, if one gives people a legal remedy for insult, they are more likely to feel insulted. This is true for two reasons, one economic, one psychological. As economists point out, if
you subsidize something, you get more of it.24 If the legal remedies of antidiscrimination law, particularly monetary remedies,
subsidize feelings of outrage and insult, we will get more feelings
of outrage and insult, a net social loss. Economists have also
noted the psychological endowment effect: once people are endowed with a right, they lose far more utility once that right is
interfered with than if it had never been granted at all."4

" For a widely cited example of this attitude, see Matsuda, 87 Mich L Rev at 2320
(cited in note 222).
" Ben Wildavsky, The Divide Over Day Care, Nati J 167 (Jan 24, 1998) (noting that
this is an "economic-policy truism").
2 See Jason F. Shogren and Dermot J. Hayes, Resolving Differences in Willingness to
Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87 Am Econ Rev 241, 243 (1997).
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A. Freedom of Speech
As Andrew Koppelman points out, three kinds of harm can
result from sexist speech: physical harm, psychic harm, and damage to women's status. 43 Nevertheless, government should not
censor sexist speech.
Defenders of free speech rely on three main arguments. First,
sound ideas will triumph if the marketplace of ideas is permitted
to function freely. Second, tolerance of unpopular, even harmful,
speech is necessary to allow the full flourishing of individual
autonomy and creativity. Third, government simply cannot be
trusted with the power to control public debate.244 As discussed
below, while the first two arguments have severe, perhaps fatal,
weaknesses, the third argument is sound.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas.
Civil libertarians have traditionally argued that a free "marketplace of ideas" functions efficiently. In the long run, freedom of
speech ensures the triumph of reason over prejudice, of enlightened public opinion over entrenched political and economic
power."4 The success of the civil rights movement in the political
marketplace, and the use of antidiscrimination laws to improve
the lot of minority workers in the private sector, made this seem
like a reasonable position in the context of minority rights.
The marketplace of ideas metaphor, however, is an odd one
for liberal civil libertarians to embrace. Many of those who endorse the marketplace of ideas metaphor favor heavy regulation
of the economic marketplace, including thorough antidiscrimination laws. Yet it seems clear that as a rule the economic market is
far more likely to protect minorities than the ideological market.
In a free economic market, minorities will be protected from
discrimination to some degree because employers have an incentive not to discriminate; if they discriminate, they have to pay
more for workers.246 While the economic marketplace is to this
degree self-regulating, the marketplace of ideas does not have
2"3 Koppelman, AntidiscriminationLaw at 235 (cited in note 1). All of these harms can
also ultimately result from giving the government more power over speech.
2, A fourth important rationale for strong protection of free speech, that it is essential

to the democratic process, seems primarily limited to a defense of free political speech, and
will not be considered here. See generally Nicholas Wolfson, Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free
Speech 29 (Praeger 1997).
2,2 Michael S. Greve, Civil Rights and Uncivil Speech, 1994 Pub Int L Rev 1, 2 (1994).
See generally Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago 1957); Epstein, Forbidden Grounds(cited in note 3).
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similar internal checks.247 Unlike businesspeople who have an
incentive to find the best workers to enhance profits, the average
citizen seeking an ideology to guide her voting has little incentive
to seek truth.
As Bryan Caplan of the George Mason Economics Department explains in two recent papers, the average citizen has no
effect on what government does, and knows it.24 Because any
individual voter's opinion is highly unlikely to be decisive, it
makes little sense for the voter to invest resources in understanding any particular issue, but it makes perfect sense for the
voter to take a position that she finds appealing despite her ignorance. Thus, when the average citizen commits to an ideological
position, that individual will normally be rationally irrational she will adopt a position that makes her feel good for some reason, regardless of the objective validity of the position.249 The aggregation of votes by rationally irrational voters is obviously
quite dangerous, especially for minority groups, which are often
the subject of emotionally powerful, but false, myths.
Worse yet, opportunistic propagandists may find it beneficial
to foment hatred based on false premises. As all too many historical (and current) examples show, racist rabble-rousing can lead to
public acclaim, even grand political careers.25
Moreover, private discrimination generally causes far less
harm to the victimized groups than policies enacted by a racist
government whose views emerged victorious in the local marketplace of ideas. Richard Epstein has argued that even if the vast
majority of employers discriminate, in a free market the economic
effect on minorities will be minimal, because they will gravitate
to niche fields and to non-discriminating employers."' One does
not have to accept fully Epstein's economic analysis to recognize
that there is empirical support for his point. Many despised
...As Judge Easterbrook has concluded in the context of racist speech: "Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters' biases - these and many more influence the culture and shape our socialization. None is directly answerable by more speech,
unless that speech too finds its place in the popular culture." American Booksellers Assn,
Inc v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 330 (7th Cir 1985). Easterbrook adds, consistent with this
author's view: "Yet all is protected as speech, however insidious. Any other answer leaves
the government in control of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor and director
of which thoughts are good for us." Id.
Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality (Feb 1999 draft) (on
file with publisher); Bryan Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief (Feb 1999 draft) (on file
with publisher).
"
See note 248.
""
For a theoretical explanation of this phenomenon, see Jennifer Roback, Racism as
Rent Seeking, 27 Econ Inquiry 661 (1989).
" Epstein, ForbiddenGrounds (cited in note 3).
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groups, such as Jews in pre-World War II Europe and the overseas Chinese, have thrived economically despite discrimination.252
On the other hand, there is no escape for minorities if racist ideas
win out in the political process.2"3 David Duke poses far more
danger to minorities than does Denny's.
Thus, if anything, restrictions on freedom of speech are more
likely to protect minorities and women than are laws banning
discrimination in employment. Once one accepts the premise that
government should intervene in the economic marketplace, it is
difficult to accept the premise that the government should not
intervene in the far less efficient speech marketplace.254 The marketplace of ideas metaphor should therefore carry little weight in
debates over restrictions on speech that offends antidiscrimination norms, particularly among those who are not economic libertarians.
2. Autonomy.
Another traditional justification for not having the government regulate speech is to preserve individual autonomy, and
allow individual self-expression. Civil rights advocates, however,
can turn the self-expression argument on its head. Many advocates of the regulation of racist and sexist speech argue that such
speech "has a silencing effect" on the targeted group, 5 thereby
excluding them from and distorting "public debate."25 ' In the context of the regulation of pornography, Catharine MacKinnon and
See generally Thomas Sowell, Markets and Minorities (Basic Books 1982).
Compare the following quote by Yale Law Professor Abraham Goldstein: "Those
who see efforts to regulate group libel as taking us down a 'slippery slope' to censorship
pay too little attention to a second 'slippery slope' - one which can produce a swift slide
into a 'marketplace of ideas' in which bad ideas flourish and good ones die." Quoted in
James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, Hate Crimes: CriminalLaw and Identity Politics
111 (Oxford 1998).
' Nadine Strossen, of the ACLU, herself a strong defender of free speech, concedes:
Because racial domination and gender oppression have proved stubbornly
intransigent, because our nation's social and political consensus still
seems to exclude an active commitment to equal justice, some of us in the
ACLU no longer adhere to what we view as the discredited argument that
"neutral principles" - instead of explicit choices among differing values
- will resolve most important legal and moral questions.
Gale and Strossen, 2 Yale J L & Feminism at 171-72 (cited in note 4). Certainly, if one
believes that a "commitment to equal justice" has lost in the marketplace of ideas, it becomes rather difficult to argue that the marketplace is working favorably for groups that
have faced discrimination.
' Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided:Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State
Power 119 (Westview 1996).
Id at 117.
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Andrea Dworkin argue that women are deprived of true freedom
of speech when they are relegated to a subordinate gender role.257
They contend that women who participate in pornography are not
expressing themselves, but are doing what the dominant patriarchy forces them to do.
Similarly, Professor Mary Becker argues that hostile environment law serves First Amendment interests because it results
in a workplace with greater free speech and individual autonomy
for workers.25 When bigoted speech is suppressed, women, gays,
and others will no longer feel silenced. Her argument could be
applied to hostile educational environments as well."s While such
arguments do not completely negate the autonomy point, they
caution against too strong a reliance on this rationale for opposing speech regulations.
3. Distrustof Government.
At this point, we have seen that the two primary rationales
modern civil libertarians have given for protecting speech from
regulations are of questionable merit in the context of antidiscrimination laws. But liberals have frequently neglected the most
powerful argument in favor of restricting government regulation
of speech: the Framers wisely did not trust the government with
the power to establish an official orthodoxy on any issue. They
recognized the danger that state actors ultimately would use the
power to do so in self-serving ways destructive to the polity at
An anti-pornography ordinance drafted by Dworkin and MacKinnon and enacted
in Indianapolis in 1984, was declared unconstitutional in American Booksellers Assn, Inc v
Hudnut, 598 F Supp 1316, 1335 (S D Ind 1984), affd, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), affd
mem, 475 US 1001 (1986).
Mary Becker, How Free is Speech at Work?, 29 UC Davis L Rev 815 (1996). For the
view that hostile environment law can contribute to enhancing the workplace's role as a
"crucial arena of constructive interracial engagement," see Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: PreliminaryThoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U Pa J Lab & Empl L 49, 54 (1998).
As a University of New Hampshire Women's Studies professor commented regarding Silva v University of New Hampshire, 888 F Supp 293 (D NH 1994) (see notes
107-09 and accompanying text):
Academia ... has traditionally been dominated by white heterosexual
men, and the First Amendment and Academic Freedom (FAF) traditionally have protected the rights of white heterosexual men. Most of us are
silenced by existing social conditions before we get the power to speak out
in any way where FAF might protect us. So forgive us if we don't get all
teary-eyed about FAF. Perhaps to you it's as sacrosanct as the flag or national anthem; to us strict construction of the First Amendment is just
another yoke around our necks.
Kors and Silverglate, The Shadow University at 120-21 (cited in note 46).
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large, and/or to repress dissenting minority opinion.2"' As Justice
Scalia has written, "the absolutely central truth of the First
Amendment [is] that government cannot be trusted to assure,
through censorship, the 'fairness' of political debate."2 1'
The fact that many academic commentators believe that creating a government-imposed speech orthodoxy is an important
and necessary tool in the fight against sex discrimination does
not change this fundamental insight. In fact, the reason constitutional protections exist is to prevent rights from being trampled
on when it seems like a really good idea at the time.262
Ironically, preserving restrictions on government regulation
of speech ultimately will benefit radical feminists and critical
race theorists as much as anyone. They advocate speech regulations while living primarily in the very left-wing academic world,
where their views are only marginally out of the mainstream.
' See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U Chi L Rev 49, 72-74 (1996). Koppelman argues in a related context that
"[riacist speech may be substantively worthless, but outlawing it would give the state the
power to decide which political views are worthless because racist. Such a power is so
easily abused that it can be justified only if the speech in question is also exceedingly
harmful." Koppelman, AntidiscriminationLaw at 230 (cited in note 1). The major problem
here is with Koppelman's caveat: by what objective standard can courts and legislatures
determine what speech is "exceedingly harmful," and what institutional mechanisms
would prevent the issue from degenerating into pure rent-seeking by lobbying groups
seeking to silence those that oppose their agendas?
Koppelman later argues that "[t]he goal of integrating the sexes in the workplace is
... an*indispensable one for the antidiscrimination project. If free speech impedes the
realization of that goal in a major way, and if antidiscrimination values could be realized
by means of a significant, but limited, infringement on free speech, then it is not unreasonable to strike the balance in favor of antidiscrimination." Id at 252. Even accepting
Koppelman's premise that integrating traditionally male workplaces is of great importance, he does not, and really cannot, define such terms as a "major way," or a "significant,
but limited, infringement on free speech." I know and trust Andy, and I would not necessarily fear for American civil liberties if he were in charge of defining these terms. But in
the real world, these terms will be defined through a political process by people I do not
trust, and who probably do not deserve to be trusted.
Finally, Koppelman suggests that because the law of workplace harassment today
infringes severely on workers' First Amendment rights, it should be discarded as soon as
possible without abandoning the goals of the antidiscrimination project. Id at 254. The
optimistic view of politics this wish implies seems a bit naive. It took Congress decades to
get rid of the ridiculous mohair subsidy, and it was resurrected just a few years later.
George Will, Reason One of the Few Things Not Included in Spending Bill, Seattle PostIntell A9 (Oct 26, 1998). In the absence of constitutional constraints, it will likely be much
harder to get rid of workplace harassment law. The way to stop infringement on workers'
First Amendment rights by harassment law is to not create an exemption for harassment
law in the first place. .
"' Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia dissenting). In Cohen v California,403 US 15, 25 (1971), the Court questioned the ability of government to make "principled distinctions" with regard to speech.
2" See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober ControllingPhilip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in HistoricalPerspective, 51 Vand L Rev 797, 878-79 (1998).
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But if the First Amendment is weakened sufficiently by antidiscrimination law and the government gains the power to suppress speech more broadly, feminists and critical race theorists,
as holders of views wildly to the "left" of those of the public at
large, are likely to be among the first victims. 2 6 3 One need not ac-

cept the view propounded by many critical race scholars and
feminists that America is innately and irredeemably racist and
sexist 2" to realize that the Critical Race and Feminist Party, if
such a thing existed, would not exactly sweep the American electorate anytime soon." But since they claim to believe that
America is this way, one would think that they would find constitutional protections against the majority especially meaningful.
There is something almost poignant about a Jewish, radical
feminist lesbian like Andrea Dworkin fighting to give the state
more control over public discourse.266
Kate Zhou, a Chinese political scientist now living in the
United States, writing from experience as a former citizen of a
totalitarian country, rebukes feminists who support censorship:
For many years, sexist language was banned by the
Chinese state (at least in the urban public sphere). Urban
Chinese women were very much "free" from sexist verbal
attacks. Many women including myself were willing to
give up freedom of some degree of protection and security.
When everyone lost the freedom to speak, women's independent voice was also gone. When women's voices were
silenced, women suffered.

As I likely would be for my decidedly non-mainstream views on many issues.
See Suzanna Sherry and Daniel Farber, Beyond all reason; Some radical lawyers
are making an unenlightenedassault on the truth, two Minnesota professors argue, (Minneapolis) Star Trib 19A (Feb 9, 1998) (noting that critical legal scholars are teaching their

students "that the United States is irredeemably racist and sexist").
' In fact, according to two recent polls, only 26 percent of American women consider
themselves feminists, and 67 percent do not. Age Is Just a Number, Roll Call (July 16,
1998) (reporting on poll conducted for Time Magazine); USA Today Poll: Mothers, daughters see brighterfuture, USA Today 10A (Feb 17, 1999). Even among the 26 percent, it is

unlikely that many have views as extreme as the average academic feminist.
'
It has been widely noted that after a MacKinnon-inspired Canadian Supreme
Court opinion allowing pornography to be suppressed, the first obscenity conviction was of
a small gay and lesbian bookstore in Toronto. Koppelman, AntidiscriminationLaw at 260
(cited in note 1). Not surprisingly, Andrea Dworkin has been another victim. Two of her
books Pornography:Men Possessing Women and Woman Hating,were seized because they
"illegally eroticized pain and bondage." Nadine Strossen, The Perils of Pornophobia,The
Humanist 7 (May1995).
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Yes, we did not have to be bothered by sexist language and pornography. But we could not complain that
we had to line up two or three hours for basic food....
Is it clear to feminists that there has been no feminist
movement in those countries that practice state censorship?267

Moreover, even if one accepts the dubious premise that the
weakening of the First Amendment could be confined to cases of
alleged discrimination,268 one does not need much of an imagination to think of how antidiscrimination law could be used to silence feminist critics of the status quo. It is not unusual for men
taking classes from feminist professors to claim that these professors created a hostile environment for them.2"9 In some cases this
is no doubt true. In other cases, the men may simply not feel comfortable in "a non-patriarchal environment." Either way, the students have a colorable Title IX claim, sufficient for the Department of Education to conduct one of its mandatory investigations
upon complaint.
Professors do get into trouble for speech that the cultural left
would support. For example, a female graduate student at the
University of Nebraska was accused of sexual harassment while
teaching a course on human sexuality. ° She used a banana to
demonstrate condom application and joked that men, like basketball players "dribble before they shoot."2"1 A male student complained that she "objectified the penis" and created "a hostile environment for him as a man." '
Quoted in Patai, Heterophobiaat 205 (cited in note 45),
As Nicholas Wolfson argues:
The move toward acceptance of the new absolutes signals the eventual
end of First Amendment liberalism. There can be no limit of absolutes to
the category of racist or sexist speech. Once we admit a breach of content
or viewpoint neutrality because racist speech is false and dangerous, we
have to fight that battle on every other front as well. In every dispute we
can expect the argument that the speech under threat of censorship is
false, will lead to harm, and hence should be banned.... If we ban racist
speech, how then do we not move inexorably to the suppression of other
unpopular thought, such as communist speech .... Surely, the perversity

and evil of totalitarian communist thought is as apparent to all of us as
the evil of racist speech.
Nicholas Wolfson, Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech at 25 (cited in note 244).
2
I have heard these claims first-hand, in both college and law school.
'0 Kors and Silverglate, The Shadow University at 121 (cited in note 46).
27
Id.
272 Id. Kors and Silverglate do not report the outcome of this complaint, but do report
that the graduate student in question vowed never to teach human sexuality again.
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In another incident, a married male Christian student filed a
sexual harassment lawsuit after a lesbian psychology professor
presented a lecture on female masturbation. The student claimed
to have been "raped and trapped" by the lecture.273 Such complaints, even if found meritless, create a chilling effect on classroom speech.
While it would be unfair to speculate on the motives of the
students who filed these particular complaints, one can easily
imagine situations in which a student would bring such charges
because they disliked their professors for ideological or other reasons. Unfortunately, that is exactly the behavior that hostile environment law invites.
Admittedly, many academic feminists would argue that Title
IX should only protect women,"' since they and not men are an
oppressed class.275 That, however, is not the law, should not be
the law, and (given that men are almost half the electorate) is
highly unlikely to become the law.
Moreover, it should be a cardinal principle of political advocacy that one should not support a regime that one would not
want to be applied to oneself. This principle would not only reduce hypocrisy, but also remind political activists that politics is
unpredictable, and that power given to government often unexpectedly is ultimately used against those who advocated that the
power be exercised against others. Once the First Amendment is
weakened to support feminist causes, it will be that much weaker
when it is feminists themselves who are under attack. So, defenders of the First Amendment really want to save radical feminists like Professor MacKinnon from themselves.
It should be noted that because the fear-of-government rational for protecting speech does not rely on marketplace of ideas
or autonomy concerns, it allows room for private organizations,
including private workplaces and universities, to adopt speech
restrictions, so long as they are not mandated by law.276 In some
23

Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L J 1683, 1793

(1998).
Compare Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw U L Rev 106
(1986) (arguing that public accommodations laws should apply to male but not female

clubs).
27'

Note, however, that female professors have power over male students through

grades, recommendations, et cetera.
278 This is not true, unfortunately, in California, where the "Leonard Law" applies
First Amendment standards to private schools. Cal Educ Code § 48950 (West 1993) (applying to elementary and secondary schools); Cal Educ Code § 943671(a) (West Supp 1999)
(applying to post-secondary education). Such legislation is a mistake and should be repealed.
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cases, such as a ban on racial or sexual epithets in the workplace,
such restrictions would usually be wise (though some employers
might choose to market themselves as "First Amendment" workplaces). In other cases, such as speech codes at private universities, the restrictions may often be unwise. But in a free, diverse
society, these issues should be decided by actors within civil society, not by government.
B. Freedom of Association
Sex discrimination by private social organizations can cause
real harm. Many social clubs are venues where business contacts
are made, business friendships cemented, and business deals (informally) negotiated. In the educational setting, "[i]f students do
not learn how to interact comfortably with [members of the opposite sex] while at school, they may be unable to do so in the workplace, which is especially harmful if they are in a position to hire
others."2' More generally, discrimination in private organizations
may foster "an acceptance of discrimination" elsewhere. If a class
of people is deemed not good enough for a particular social group,
it also may seem appropriate to exclude members of that group
from other parts of the social and business world.278
Nevertheless, as discussed below, there are many reasons
why freedom of association (which includes the freedom not to
associate) should be given more weight by legislatures and courts
in the context of single-sex organizations. First, freedom of association enhances autonomy. Second, freedom of association is a
prerequisite for the exercise of other important liberties. Third,
the positive effects of laws requiring private organizations to accept women as members are generally minimal. Fourth, the laws
at times create fairly clear social harms without clear social benefits. Fifth, freedom of association benefits women as well as men.
And, sixth, unpopular groups are far more likely to be targets of
official campaigns against "discrimination" than are mainstream
organizations.
1. Autonomy.
Freedom of association is "the freedom to lead of a life of experiences in the company one chooses."279 Admittedly, as George
"' Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of AntiDiscriminationLaws, 2 Mich J Gender & L 27, 34 (1994).
"'
Id at 36-37.
27
Kateb, Value ofAssociation at 42 (cited in note 201).
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Kateb acknowledges, "a good deal of associative life is shallow or
trivial." "But," he adds, "what is freedom if not the ability to do
what others may think not worth doing." s° As Kateb notes, the
value of much social experience is a matter of taste, and "in a free
society, taste must be left as free as possible, as a matter of
right."281
It is true that in a sense, women who wish to join all-male
organizations, but are denied membership, suffer a loss of the
ability to do as they please, which some would consider to correlate with autonomy. Overall, however, the balance of the autonomy issue heavily favors the toleration of single-sex organizations. Laws banning single-sex clubs preclude the existence of
such clubs, meaning that anyone who prefers membership in
such organizations cannot satisfy his or her preference. On the
other hand, tolerance of all-male clubs allows for the existence of
co-ed clubs or all-female clubs for those who prefer that associative experience. As Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme has noted:
The value of a pluralistic, democratic society is that it
permits members of each group to join with others sharing
their views, to pool their resources as they wish, to seek
the resources of new members, and to experiment to try to
prove the validity of their respective concepts. 2
2. Freedom of Association is a Prerequisiteto the Exercise of
Other ImportantFreedoms.
As the Supreme Court has noted, without a corresponding
freedom to decide with whom to associate, the First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, freedom of
assembly, and freedom to petition the government for redress of
grievances "could not be vigorously protected from interference by
the State."2s3 This point was brought home dramatically in the
1950s, when southern state governments attempted to defeat the
civil rights movement by curtailing the associative rights of activists.'
Id at 40.
281

Id at 42.

Isbister v Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc, 707 P2d 212, 229 (Cal 1985) (Mosk dissenting).
'
Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 622 (1984).
2N
See, for example, NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449, 453 (1958);
NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 419 (1963).
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Unfortunately, this point has received more lip service than
real consideration by courts and legislatures. In Roberts, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that according to the
Jaycees' charter, the organization's central purpose was "promoting the interests of young men."'85 Moreover, national, state,
and local chapters of the Jaycees (including the Minnesota chapter) took positions on a wide range of political issues, ranging
from support for President Reagan's economic policies to favoring
reduction in the size of Minnesota's legislature.286 The Court acknowledged that political advocacy was a "not insubstantial part"
of the Jaycees activities, but found no evidence on the record that
the compelled acceptance of women as Jaycees would "change the
content or impact of the organization's speech.'"5 7
As Kateb argues, the Court's assertion that forcing the Jaycees to admit women is unrelated to the suppression of ideas and
would not hamper the organization's ability to express its views
is "not believable."' Kateb points out that the Court's implicit
claim that young women would use their membership to contribute to the permissible purpose of "promoting the interests of
young men" is dubious, at best.289 In fact, "The plain intention
behind the command to admit women to full membership is to
redefine the interests of young men, to get them to think that
they have0 no interests distinct or separate from those of young
women."

29

More generally, it is highly unlikely that an all-male electorate will have the same views on a variety of issues as a sexintegrated electorate. As Linder suggests, it would be absurd to
argue that forcing the KKIK to admit blacks would have no effect
on the organization's philosophy.291 One does not have to engage
in stereotyping, Linder continues, to recognize that "The impact
Roberts, 468 US at 627.
Rosenblum, Membership and Morals at 192-93 (cited in note 213).
Roberts, 468 US at 627-28. In fact, Rotary International's amicus brief pointed to
the "gender gap" in political views.
Kateb, The Value of Association at 55 (cited in note 201).
Id.
"'
Id.
2
Linder, 82 Mich L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 210). Since Linder's article appeared,
this issue actually arose in federal court. Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F Supp 281 (D Md 1988). The Klan applied for a permit to
parade on the streets of Thurmont, Maryland. The parade was for the purpose of showing
the Klan's support for the "Just Say No to Drugs" program, the AARP, and for recruitment
of new members. The permit was denied and the Klan filed suit. The court held that
Thurmont unconstitutionally imposed a nondiscrimination condition on the Klan's parade.
The court noted that forcing the Klan to allow blacks to march in its parade would "change
the primary message which the KKK advocates." Id at 288.
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on the expressive activities of the Jaycees resulting from the admission of women would be far less dramatic, but no less
certain."292 As Nancy Rosenblum concludes, "The Jaycees' 'voice'
was undeniably altered once it was forced to admit young women
as full members along with young men.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in Roberts, acknowledged that
"Protection of the association's right to define its membership
derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice."294 O'Connor nevertheless concurred because she found that the Jaycees were primarily a "nonexpressive," "commercial" association.295 According to O'Connor,
the Jaycees were therefore subject to regulation, even though
they engaged in a "not insubstantial volume" of constitutionally
protected activities.296
The problem with O'Connor's argument is that the line between commercial associations and political organizations is not
easily drawn, nor can one predict when a commercial association
will metamorphose into an important expressive association. For
example, America's most powerful lobbying organization, the
American Association of Retired Persons, began as a commercial
association organized to sell health care products to the elderly,
and still has substantial business interests.297
3. The Effects of PublicAccommodations Laws Are Minimal.
An irony of public accommodations laws is that outside of
unique circumstances, such as regional differences in views on
racial segregation in the 1960s,29 such laws will generally only
reach either economically inconsequential discrimination, or discrimination that can be largely eliminated through voluntary
Linder, 82 Mich L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 210).
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and
the Dynamic of Exclusion, in Amy Gutmann, ed, Freedom of Association at 79 (cited in
note 201).
Roberts, 468 US at 633 (O'Connor concurring).
Id at 638-40.
Id at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dale Van Atta, Trust Betrayed: Inside the AARP (Regnery 1998).
When federal legislators, judges, administrators, and juries forced the South to
desegregate, they were following the wishes of the national majority, though not the recalcitrant southern minority. Note that because southern juries could not be relied upon,
many early civil rights cases were decided administratively by the EEOC or Office of Federal Contract Compliance, or were brought in federal court in the District of Columbia.
Southern officials, meanwhile, were not often much more progressive than their citizens
on the issue of race, and frequently actually pushed local politics further in a racist direction.
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means. This follows from the American system of government.
Americans rely on democratically-elected representatives to pass
laws, and on judges, administrators, and juries to enforce them.
There is little reason to believe that these groups are far ahead of
the public in deciding that established forms of discriminatory
associations are harmful and should not be tolerated. Once the
public has accepted that the exclusion of certain groups from certain associations creates intolerable harms, such discrimination
will be on the way out through voluntary mechanisms.
Law can accelerate the process somewhat, as voluntary social
change is (or at least can be) a more drawn out process than the
enforcement of legislative edicts. Law can also prevent outliers
who disagree with the social consensus from continuing to engage
in discrimination. But it hardly seems that the right of association should be sacrificed for slightly quicker social change and the
suppression of a few outliers.
As discussed previously, although the Jaycees litigation has
been portrayed as an extremely important victory for women's
rights,299 the litigation actually illustrates how meager the gains
to equality often are when sex discrimination law triumphs over
freedom of association. The Jaycees litigation arose at a time
when women were just starting to enter the executive level of the
business world in large numbers. Not surprisingly, this led to a
major change in social attitudes toward all-male clubs used for
socializing among businessmen. Almost no one had questioned
the legitimacy of such clubs just a few decades earlier; as noted
previously, even clearly public accommodations were not barred
from discrimination on the basis of sex in the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 301 Yet by 1984, the Supreme Court argued that not only can
such clubs be constitutionally forced to admit women, but that
eliminating discrimination by such clubs is a "compelling interest" sufficient to trump the right to freedom of association.0 2
But the change in social attitudes manifested by the Court's
decision could hardly help but affect the Jaycees as well. If the
case had come out the other way, and the national Jaycees continued to refuse to accept women as full members, dissenting
chapters could have become the pioneers of a successful, compet'
President Clinton did not appoint Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit to
the Supreme Court in part because feminist groups were angry at his decision, reversed
by the Supreme Court, holding that forcing the Jaycees to admit women was unconstitutional. Negatives Knocked Out Babbitt,Arnold, St Louis Post-Dispatch 6A (May 15, 1994).
301 See note 5 and accompanying text.
See Part II B.
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ing national organization. "Unreconstructed male Jaycees," Rosenblum
notes, might have been marginalized in their all-male
03
clubs.

3

In fact, by the time the Court decided Roberts, the national
Jaycees organization was ready to admit women. Although the
Supreme Court's opinion only necessitated that the national organization not punish the Minnesota chapter for admitting
women members, and courts in three other state and local courts
had held that the Jaycees were not covered by relevant public
accommodations laws,30 4 the national Jaycees voted at their next
annual meeting to admit women as full members in all
chapters.3 5
Did the litigation help push the Jaycees toward this minor
victory for women in the business world? Probably so, but it
would have happened soon enough.
Indeed, the broader history of "service" organizations demonstrates that significant social change can occur without it being
forced by law. By 1992, even though only a few jurisdictions required private clubs to admit women,3 6 the growth of women's
membership in these organizations was exponential." 7 All major
organizations had a substantial percentage of women members,
with the Lions Clubs at about 5 percent, Rotary at about 8 percent, Kiwanis at about 11 percent, Sertoma at about 17 percent,
and the Optimists at about 18 percent.308 The Jaycees, 30 9 which

changed demographically more far rapidly than the others beRosenblum, Compelled Association at 86 (cited in 294).
United States Jaycees v Richardet, 666 P2d 1008, 1011-12 (Alaska 1983); United
States Jaycees v Bloomfield, 434 A2d 1379, 1381 (DC 1981); United States Jaycees v Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,463 NE2d 1151 (Mass 1983). However, a
few years later the Iowa Supreme Court held that the Jaycees, which by then had voted to
allow women to be members, were covered by that state's public accommodations statute.
United States Jaycees v Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 427 NW2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1988).
Id at 452.
See J. Peder Zane, In Some Cities, Women Still Battle Barriers to Membership in
All-Male Clubs, NY Times A38 (Dec 8, 1991) (noting that it is legal to exclude women from
private clubs in most of the country).
" Sam Hodges, Women Bringing New Life to Service Clubs, Las Vegas Rev-J 3C
(June 10, 1992).
Id.
9 It is true that the law did play some role in accelerating this change. Following
Supreme Court rulings in 1987 and 1988, New York State Club Assn, Inc v City of New
York, 487 US 1 (1988), Board of Directors of Rotary International v Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 US 537 (1987), that laws requiring ruled clubs to admit women were constitutional,
the largest non-sectarian service organizations that had previously excluded women voted
to allow individual chapters to admit women. However, these organizations did not require individual chapters to admit women, but only permitted them to do so. Nevertheless,
almost all chapters soon voted to admit women, suggesting that the national organizations' policies would have soon changed regardless.
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cause of its age limit of 35, was 42 percent female. 1 In Florida
alone, the president of the state Jaycees was a woman, four of the
thirty-nine Rotary clubs in Central Florida had women presidents, and three of the twelve presidents of the Orlando district
Kiwanis clubs were women. 1 ' By 1997, about 13 percent of Rotarians were women, and more than 1,500 women had held the
position of club president. 2 Rotary International expects onethird of its members to be women by 2017."s3
Interestingly, perhaps the most influential service organization to remain single-sex is the all-female Junior League. In 1995,
the Junior League, an organization with 193,000 mostly affluent
members, voted to continue to exclude men.14 In 1996, the San
Jose, California chapter refused to admit a male hair stylist. "It's
the height of discrimination. I would be such a dedicated member," Clark Clementsen said." 5 The president of the chapter argued that there is a social need for an organization like the Junior League. "Women need an organization where they can de31
velop leadership skills,' she said."

1

4. Social Good of Single-Sex Organizations Often Outweighs
Social Harm.
While single sex organizations can harm those excluded, single-sex organizations create some positive social goods that can
outweigh the countervailing social harm of segregation. Unlike
racial segregation, for example, sex segregation is frequently motivated not by animus toward the excluded group, but by a desire
to achieve positive social or philanthropic ends.
For example, many believe that college fraternity and sorority members experience a "special camaraderie" that would not
exist if members of the opposite sex were included. 17 For young
people especially, the presence of the opposite sex in a social setting is likely to create sexual tension and concern for one's ap-

Hodges, Women Bringing New Life to Service Clubs, Las Vegas Rev-J 3C (cited in
note 307).
330

31 Id.

John O'Connell, Woman Takes Helm of Club for First Time in its History, St Louis
Post-Dispatch 6 (Nov 17, 1997).
32

3,3 Id.
31, Maria

Goodavage, CaliforniaJuniorLeague Says Man Can't Cut It, Chi Sun-Times
19 (Feb 19, 1996).
3'

Id.

Id.
...Frank, 2 Mich J Gender & L at 34 (cited in note 277).
316
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pearance, making it harder for them to relax and to get away
from the pressure and stress of everyday life.318
Moreover, men and women, and boys and girls, may have
different needs that are best addressed by separate organizations. For example, teenage boys are much more likely than girls
to commit crimes, particularly violent crimes. Indeed, in the Isbister case involving the Santa Cruz Boys' Club, 19 the Club argued that it needed to conserve its limited resources for boys, who
are far more likely than girls to be arrested as youths."' The
Club also noted that if enough girls decided to join, it might need
to drop its open door policy and limit access to the club at certain
3

hours.

21

More generally, philanthropic organizations catering separately to male and female youths can do more good than mixed
groups, at least for some kids. After the Isbister decision was announced, Etta Keeler, a spokeswoman for a Girls' Club in San
Diego County said that the poor girls her club caters too, many of
whom are pregnant or have babies, "would not be helped by being
placed with young men."3 22 She added that "[g]irls
need people
3 23
who understand what they're going through."

The California Supreme Court majority was completely unmoved by such notions, demanding hard evidence "that boys need
the recreation offered by the Club more than girls, that a sexsegregated 'drop-in' recreational facility is more effective in combating juvenile delinquency than one open to both sexes, or that
extension of membership to girls would cause an impractical net
increase (or decrease) in membership." 324 In the absence of such

evidence, the court saw only "arbitrary" discrimination."=
In dissent, Justice Mosk noted that the plaintiff and her supporters believed that society would benefit if all relevant charitable facilities were available either to children of both sexes or to
none at all. But other citizens, those who donated money to establish the Club, and those who charitably maintain it - believe
their community will benefit by more narrowly using the property
to aid disadvantaged boys.3 2' For a variety of reasons, some do318 Id.

...Isbister v Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc, 707 P2d 212, 214 (Cal 1985).
32

Id at 223.

3'
12

Id.
Nelligan, Editorial, Boys' Clubs No More?, San Diego Union-Trib B6 (Oct 25, 1985).
Id.

32

Isbister, 707 P2d at 223.
at 224.

"'Id

Id at 229.
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nors might prefer to give to groups that benefit boys, others to
groups that benefit girls, and others that benefit all children.
Some of these donors might have an animus toward one sex of
children, but most of those who donate to single-sex organizations
likely simply have personal reasons for wanting to help either
boys or girls. 27 For example, an elderly woman named Ruth
Mallery founded the Santa Cruz Boys' Club that was at issue in
2 ' Mallery recalled that when she grew up, boys who had
Isbister."
little to keep them busy often got into trouble. She therefore donated $1.5 million to build a Boys' Club - with the understanding that the money was to be used only to help boys.2
The net result of forbidding the existence of single-sex charitable organizations is that some donors will not be able to satisfy
fully their preferences. The logical response of these frustrated
donors will be to either reduce their donations to children's charities, or not donate at all. The California Supreme Court, stuck in
abstract antidiscrimination reasoning, was unable to come up
with any reason even remotely compelling enough to risk a decline in much-needed philanthropy for children.
5. Laws Banning Single-Sex Organizations Prevent Women
from CreatingSuch Organizations.
Professor Deborah Rhode has argued that while the government should forcibly integrate all-male associations, all-female
associations should be left alone. This differentiation is justified
because "Separatism imposed by empowered groups carries different symbolic and practical significance than separatism chosen
by subordinate groups."330
Rhode's argument fails because although women as a group
may lose more from being excluded from male associations than
men lose from being excluded from women's groups, a given individual man may have a real loss because of his exclusion by
women. Imagine, for example, if the professional association of a
female-dominated profession such as nursing excluded men.33 '
Moreover, as Rhode herself acknowledges, "a law that explicitly differentiates between men's and women's association ...
" For example, they may want to honor a son or daughter who died young, or repay
kindness shown to them as children by a particular organization.
"' Dan Morain, Next Target: Sex Bias in Men's Clubs, LA Times 1 (Nov 15, 1985).
29

'

Id.
Rhode, 81 Nw U L Rev at 106 (cited in note 274).
See also text accompanying notes 274-76 (discussing why it should be a "cardinal

principle of political advocacy that one should not support a regime that one would not
want to be applied to oneself").
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may prove politically unpalatable." 332 Indeed, it does not appear

that any public accommodations ordinances differentiate between
all-male and all-female organizations.33
A requirement that organizations established for only women
admit men causes real harm to women, as demonstrated by the
rather mundane example of women's-only health clubs. While one
commentator argues that "there is really no need for exclusively
single-sex health clubs,"334 women are voting with their feet in
favor of such clubs. Nationwide, about two million women belong
to 2,000 all-women fitness facilities.3 5 Women frequently join
women-only health clubs to avoid unwanted male attention, such
as ogling, while they exercise. Abuse survivors, women who have
had mastectomies, overweight women, and women with religious
objections to working out in front of men are particularly receptive to single-sex facilities.338
In 1988, noted feminist attorney Gloria Allred filed a sex discrimination lawsuit on behalf of a Los Angeles man denied admission to a women's-only health club.33 ' Although evolutionary

theory, s common sense, and common experience, all suggest that
heterosexual men are inclined to "check out" women, particularly
scantily-clad women, Allred reduced the issue to "unfair and inaccurate stereotypes that unfairly penalize individuals in the
group who do not fit the stereotype." 9 Allred argued that it is
"unfair stereotyping to assume that all men ogle."34

Rhode, 81 Nw U L Rev at 127 (cited in note 274).
Single-sex universities, which nowadays are almost all women's colleges, are exempted from Title IX, but the same exemption applies to any college that desires to be allmale, such as Hampton-Sydney College, a private liberal arts college for men.
Frank, 2 Mich J Gender & L at 68 (cited in note 277).
Ellen Goodman, Desire for Women-only Health Clubs Is No Show Of Strength,
Fresno Bee B7 (Feb 13, 1998).
3m Id.
37
Laura-Lynne Powell, Anaheim Activist Roots Out Bias Against Men, Orange
County Register 1 (April 17, 1992).
'
See Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (Pantheon 1994).
'
T.W. McGarry, FeministAllred Files Suit Against Health Clubs for Excluding Men,
LA Times 14 (Feb 14, 1987).
3" Id. Even if Allred is correct, she does not explain how a club would enforce an
"anti-ogling" policy on an individual basis. One could easily imagine the result of such a
policy:

Staff member: Ms. Jones complained that you were ogling her.
Accused Ogler: I was not; I was admittedly looking in her direction, but I
wasn't looking at her.
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The owner of the club defended its women-only policy by arguing that its benefits were significant and that its costs were
minimal:
The public accommodations law that was passed in 1971
was meant to address areas of real harm, like places
where commercial deals and business discussions took
place while women had no opportunity to participate. This
is so different. Is there a positive social value by allowing
this exclusion? Yes. Is anyone truly harmed by it? No. So
why be stuck in some dogmatic position that doesn't recognize the correctness of this decision?"'
Ultimately, the club agreed to settle the lawsuit and admit
3 42
men.
Also in 1988, the Minnesota Human Rights Department
ruled that health clubs could not exclude men from
membership. 1 3 In 1992, three all-female health clubs in Orange
County, California, agreed to open their membership to men,344
following a complaint that Dennis Koire filed with the State Department of Fair Employment and Housing."5
In 1993, Wisconsin's Labor and Industry Review Commission, acting on a complaint filed by a man, fined an exercise club
$500 for holding women-only aerobics classes.346 The owner of the
club protested, "It's a privacy issue. The women are sweating,
they don't have makeup on, and they feel that the guys are staring at their butts."3 47 The club appealed, forcing the complainant
to continue his case without the assistance of the attorney general. He declined to do so, and the case was dismissed.3"
" Joe Fitzgerald, Female-only Health Clubs Make Sense, Boston Herald 6 (Feb 7,
1998).
3
Health Club to Admit Men, LA Times, Metro 2 (Aug 3, 1988).
',' St. Paul man files sex discrimination suit against women-only health club, (Minneapolis) Star Trib 7B (Mar 20, 1990). Two years later, a male St. Paul resident filed a
complaint with the Human Rights Department against a Women's Workout World location. The club granted him membership, but would not allow him to use its locker room

facilities, which were designed for women only. Id. The fate of this lawsuit was not reported, but given the Human Rights Department's earlier ruling, it would seem that the

plaintiff had a strong case.

U4 Laura-Lynne Powell, Anaheim Activist Roots Out Bias Against Men, Orange

County Register at 1 (cited in note 337).
Id.

Michael R. Zahn, Bias case againstfitness club dropped, Milwaukee J B1 (Dec 30,
1993).
37 Id.
'

" Id. In 1997, an Anchorage man denied membership in a women-only health club in
Anchorage filed a complaint with the state human rights commission. Patty Sullivan,
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The federal EEOC, meanwhile, has sued women's health
clubs for refusing to hire male employees. The most important
case involved the Women's Workout World chain. 49 A federal
judge initially granted summary judgment to the EEOC.3 "
Women's Workout World then filed a motion for reconsideration
supported by a petition signed by over 10,000 members.351
The chain noted that it specialized in individual attention for
its members, and that its members did not want men touching
them during workouts or seeing them disrobed. 352 The judge concluded that the Women's Workout World "articulated a legitimate
privacy interest with regard to nudity,"3 53 and withdrew the
summary judgment, but allowed the case to continue. 3 ' After
seven years of being bled by litigation expenses, Women's Workout World settled.3 5 5 The company agreed to hire men for certain
"restructured" positions that would (hopefully) prevent invasion
of members' privacy, and to set aside $30,000 to compensate men
who had been turned down for jobs.356
Some complaints of discrimination by women's-only health
clubs have failed. In 1992, a Pennsylvania court ruled that a
chain of women-only health clubs did not have to admit men because privacy considerations overrode antidiscrimination con3 57

cerns.

In 1997, a Massachusetts Superior Court ruled that a
women-only health club, Healthworks Fitness Center, could not
bar men.3 ' The decision was met with dismay by the 40,000
members of such clubs throughout Massachusetts.3 59 The National Organization for Women, however, supported the ruling
because it outlawed "discrimination." 6 ° Despite NOW's objections, legislators responded to a flood of protests from angry
women exercise enthusiasts by passing a law exempting singleSpurned Man FilesProtest:Membership Denial Spurs Rights Case, Anchorage Daily News
B1 (Aug 20, 1997).
','
EEOC v Sedita, 755 F Supp 808 (N D Ill 1991).
39
Id at 809.
"
EEOC v Sedita, 816 F Supp 1291, 1297 (N D Ill 1993).
Id at 1293.
Id at 1296.
Id at 1298.
Mary Ellen Podmolik, Women's Workout World Agrees to Hire Male Workers, Chi
Sun-Times 65 (June 15, 1994).
Id.
Livingwell (North) Inc v PennsylvaniaHuman Rights Commission, 606 A2d 1287,
1294 (Pa 1992).
" Women Only, Providence J-Bulletin Cl (Nov 3, 1997).
35 Id.
Id.
36
'
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clubs from Massachusetts's public accommodations
sex health
61
3

law.

6. Bans on Discrimination in Public Accommodations are
Applied Selectively against UnpopularGroups.
Another reason to protect freedom of association from antidiscrimination laws is that government agencies charged with
enforcing these laws will tend to target unpopular groups." 2 For
example, in 1994, the Nation of Islam sought permission to rent
the Cleveland convention center for a men-only meeting." 3
Cleveland sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the
men's event would violate Ohio's public accommodations law by
excluding women, and that denying the facility to the Nation
would not violate the Nation's free exercise rights. The Nation, in
turn, sought a declaratory judgment permitting it to restrict its
event to men, in accordance with its religious tradition.3 "'
After a federal district court ruled in favor of the Nation on
freedom of association grounds,3" Nancy Lesic, spokeswoman for
Mayor Michael White, told reporters that the city "did not deny
anyone's rights in this case. It is an unlawful and discriminatory
practice to deny a person access to a public facility on account of
factors such as gender. In this case, women were being denied
access to public accommodations."66 Yet it is difficult to imagine
the City similarly trying to force Catholics, Orthodox Jews, or for
that matter Orthodox Muslims to admit men to their meetings.
Religious associations aside, it is also difficult to imagine Cleveland denying the Boy or Girl Scouts, or other popular single-sex
organizations, access to its convention center.

3" J.M. Lawrence, Law lets women sweat where the boys aren't, Boston Herald 7 (Feb
7, 1998).
Private plaintiffs, by contrast, are more likely to sue because they perceive a real
2

injury to themselves, regardless of who caused it.
City of Cleveland v Nation of Islam, 922 F Supp 56, 57 (N D Oh 1995).
Id.
The court stated that it found for the Nation on free speech grounds, but the opinion more precisely reflects freedom of association concerns. The court found that "[if the
City is allowed to make the public accommodation law requiring Minster Farrakhan to
speak to a mixed audience, the content and character of the speech will necessarily be
changed." Id at 59. For the argument that the court should have deferred to the City's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination, see Lauren J. Rosenblum, Equal Access
or Free Speech: The Constitutionality of Public Accommodations Laws, 72 NYU L Rev
1243 (1997).
3'
Richard Carelli, Court Denies Cleveland Bid to Avoid Legal Fees, The Plain Dealer
2B (Jan 21, 1998).
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C. Freedom of Religion
There is a vigorous debate in the law review literature over
whether the federal Constitution requires courts to apply the
compelling government interest test to general laws, including
antidiscrimination laws, that impinge on free exercise of
religion.367 An analogous debate has occurred over whether Congress and the states should enact such standards legislatively.
Antidiscrimination concerns have become a significant issue in
this debate. Governor Pete Wilson of California vetoed the California legislature's attempt to enact a state RFRA, partly because
the bill would have limited the government's ability to enforce
antidiscrimination laws.'~
Meanwhile, the ACLU has dropped out of a coalition supporting the Religious Liberty Protection Act, a replacement for
RFRA, because of concerns about the bill's potential effect on antidiscrimination law.369 This is evidence of dangerous backsliding
in the ACLU's commitment to civil liberties, as the ACLU had
supported RFRA. 7 ° Several Jewish groups also dropped out of the
coalition because of antidiscrimination concerns, leading an unhappy Marc Stern of the American Jewish Congress to remark:
"The principle of equality is taking on a quasi-religious status.
Maybe for some people questioning civil rights is like questioning
3 71

God."

" For example, Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Free Exercise
Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L Rev 591 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J L
& Religion 99 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:The
Case of Employment Discrimination,67 BU L Rev 391, 405 (1987); Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev
933, 942 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U Chi L Rev 1109 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exerciseof Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409 (1990); Ellis M. West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Pol 623
(1990).
'
In his veto message, Governor Pete Wilson warned that such legislation "would
open up the prospect of invalidating laws ranging from the payment of taxes to ... laws
against racial discrimination."
'
"The American Civil Liberties Union has decided not to support [the Religious
Liberty Protection Act], expressing concern that the measure would allow people to discriminate against certain groups - since courts have ruled that the prevention of bias
based on sexual orientation or marital status is not necessarily a compelling interest."
Eric Fingerhut, Religious Liberty Measure Faces Tough Legislative Path, Wash Jewish
Week 5 (Feb 11, 1999).
" See Smith v FairEmployment & Housing Commission, 12 Cal 4th 1143, 1196 n 1
(1996).
371
Eric Fingerhut, Jewish Groups Back Away from Religious Protection Act, Wash
Jewish Week 4, 5 (Oct 7, 1999).
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This Section argues that free exercise of religion should be
protected from sex discrimination laws for at least four reasons.
First, the autonomy of religious groups to establish and practice a
given set of beliefs, and to enforce those beliefs internally, is
threatened by sex discrimination laws. Second, protecting free
exercise from sex discrimination laws limits potentially serious
church-state conflict. Third, in the employment context, allowing
free exercise to trump sex discrimination laws will not have a
significant effect on the ability of women to participate equally in
the labor market. Finally, unpopular minority religious groups
will suffer disproportionate interference by the government if the
principle of free exercise is not given due weight.
1. Autonomy Concerns.
In this author's view, religious groups should not be exempt
from laws that inconvenience them to the same degree and for
the same reasons as everyone else.372 A presumption of autonomy
should apply, however - whether through judicial interpretation
of the free exercise clause or by statutory exemption373 - to situations in which civil authorities try to force religious groups to act
in ways inconsistent with the groups' religious tenets.374 Frederick Mark Gedicks explains the issues facing such groups:
The group that refuses to change a core concern to comply
with valid regulation may be liquidated and cease physically and legally to exist. The group that chooses to abandon a core concern in order to comply with regulation alters its definitional boundaries, thereby transforming itself into a different group. In either event, the group has
ceased to be, having been extinguished by the government's regulatory intervention.375

3.2

For example, in City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 512 (1997), a zoning law pre-

vented a church from expanding, inconveniencing the church no more or less than any
other property owner affected by a zoning law.
"' For a thought-provoking defense of state RFRA's as the proper solution to the
problem of general laws that impinge on religious beliefs, see Volokh, 46 UCLA L Rev at
1474-76 (cited in note 143).
"' Equally worrisome are cases in which the government tries to force individuals,
including those unaffiliated with particular churches, to violate their religious consciences. Such cases have not, however, arisen in the context of the enforcement of sex
discrimination laws, and therefore will not be discussed in this Article.
376 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious
Group Rights, 1989 Wisc L Rev 99, 112 (footnote omitted).
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2. Preventing Church-State Conflict.
Gedicks raises valid autonomy concerns, but fails to mention
that religious groups confronted with the force of the state have a
third choice, which is to resist, peacefully or otherwise. While the
United States largely has avoided violent religious conflict, until
recently government largely stayed out of religion's way. As the
government's regulatory apparatus has grown, it inevitably has
come into to greater conflict with religion, turning what would
otherwise be mere religious differences into political "culture
war" confrontations. Avoiding such confrontations would be a
sound long-term policy for the United States.
3. Discrimination Resulting from the Employer's Religious
Views is Not a Significant Problem.
While no hard statistics are available, one can surmise that
employers who desire to enforce conservative religious views
about the status of women are rare. Allowing such employers to
discriminate will not have a significant effect on the employment
prospects of women.
Meanwhile, with almost half the labor force composed of
women, employers who discriminate on religious grounds will
either (a) have a difficult time finding workers, and have to pay
those they find above-market rates or (b) find believers who agree
with the employers' religious views, and are willing to accept less
economic opportunity to work in an appropriate religious atmosphere. If (a) is the result, employers will suffer an economic loss
at little expense to women. If (b) is the result, it seems unduly
paternalistic and authoritarian in effect to forbid mutually consenting parties from. entering into employment arrangements
that preserve their respective religious values.
4. ProtectingMinority Religious Groups.
In the absence of legislative or judicial exemptions for religious groups from antidiscrimination laws, religious minorities, or,
more specifically, religious minorities with unusual beliefs and
practices, will suffer disproportionately."' This will occur because
government agencies, which are political bodies, are often responsible for deciding which cases to pursue. For example, while antidiscrimination agencies have brought several cases alleging sex
376 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U Chi L Rev 115,
139 (1992) ("Those groups whose beliefs are least foreign and least offensive to the mainstream, and those with the largest numbers and greatest visibility, will be better able to
protect themselves than will the smaller, more unpopular groups.").
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discrimination against schools affiliated with obscure fundamentalist churches, the authorities do not seem nearly as eager to
fight discrimination by groups that have strong political bases.
CONCLUSION
The triumph of an authoritarian377 antidiscrimination ideology that holds that all discrimination must be eradicated has left
relatively few defenders of civil liberties against the onslaught of
ever-more intrusive antidiscrimination laws. This Article has
tried to show that freedom of speech, association, and religion
deserve protection from infringement by sex discrimination laws.
If the Supreme Court announced that it was suspending enforcement of provisions of the Bill of Rights so as not to interfere
with legislative attempts to eliminate murder, most thoughtful
Americans would shudder in fear for the future of civil liberties.
Yet little if any protest is raised when the Supreme Court and
lower courts announce that they are, in essence, suspending enforcement of the First Amendment to further the goal of the
elimination of discrimination.
Discrimination, like other human vices, will never be eradicated. But if courts allow the government to evade the Bill of
Rights, the war against discrimination, like other literal and
metaphorical wars before it, will permit the government to acquire ever more power for itself at the expense of individual
autonomy and civil society. 78 The civil liberties protections of the
Constitution carve out islands of freedom in a sea of government
power. When enforced, they prevent government from overreaching and oppression.
In our constitutional democracy, and in any liberal system of
government, the result of the conflict between antidiscrimination
laws and civil liberties must be clear: the civil liberties protections provided by the Bill of Rights must triumph. The paradox is
that, in order to maintain a liberal society, we must acknowledge
that our laws cannot and should not aim to stop all people from
3"
The author recognizes that this is a harsh term, and does not intend to impeach
the good will of those who believe that public policy should have the goal of eliminating
discrimination. But good intentions and authoritarian ideology can and often do peacefully
coexist.
"" See generally Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: CriticalEpisodes in the Growth
of American Government (Oxford 1987) (noting relationship between perceived crises and
growth of government power). Unfortunately, ACLU president Nadine Strossen has endorsed the goal of eradicating discrimination, despite the grave threat this goal poses to
civil liberties. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L J 484, 552.
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behaving illiberally."' 9 Sex discrimination law should not be exempt from either constitutional norms or, more generally, from
our society's concern for the preservation of civil liberties.

"' See Kateb, The Value of Association at 61 (cited in note 201) ("[C]onstitutional
democracy suffers when people are legally compelled . ..to become ever more constitutional and democratic in their private relationships and transactions.... [G]overnment
should not try, by its policies, to force people to move in the right direction, unless vital
claims are involved.').
A cardinal principle of liberalism, which often seems lost in debates over antidiscrimination laws, is that government toleration of a given behavior does not constitute
endorsement of this behavior. The contrary view was expressed over fifty years ago by
Carey McWilliams, who argued that in the antidiscrimination context, "non-action on the
part of a legislature is equivalent to sanctioning the existing state of affairs." Carey
McWilliams, Race Discriminationand the Law, 9 Sci & Socy 1, 15 (1945).

